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land prior to this case ; and, from such
examination as we have been able to
make, no case involving the point has
ever been reported in this country. The
reasons advanced, however, by the
learned judges, whose opinions are reported-[the opinions of Lords BLAcEnuRN, WATSOz and BRA3n.wFLL, who

concurred with Lord

C., are, on account of want of space,
omitted]-are so clear and conclusive
as to render the citation of authorities
almost superfluous, and there would
seem to be no reasonable doubt as to
the correctness of their judgment.
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CARTON & C0. v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD C0.
An act of the state legislature, whose object and purpose is to control and regulate
the shipment of freight to points in other states, is in violation of article 1, sect. 8,
of the Constitution of the United States, as being legislation on interstate commerce,
a subject which is in its nature national, and requiring the exclusive legislation of
Congress.
An interstate contract of shipment, entered into by a common carrier, is an
entire contract, and the laws of the state wherein it is made, so far as they attempt
to regulate interstate commerce, do not enter into it as a part of the contract, being
repugnant to the Federal Constitution [BECK, J., dissenting].
A contract is subject to the laws of the state wherein it is made and which are
applicable thereto.
A state may regulate charges on shipments of goods, by statutes not in conflict
with the Constitution of the United States as regulations of commezce, and in the
absence of any legislation by Congress upon the subject, such laws cannot be regarded
as an encroachment on the anthority of the general government.
Such regulations of commerce only as impose burdens and restrictions are forbidden to the state by the Constitution of the United States, but laws which aid in
securing expeditious and cheap transportation, and which remove burdens, impediments and restrictions imposed on commerce by common carriers through unnecessary delays, and by their unreasonable and unjust exactions and discriminating
charges, are not regulations of commerce within the contemplation of the Constitution
of the United States.

APPEAL from Hardin Circuit Court.
This is an action to recover certain alleged excessive freight

charges paid by the plaintiff to the defenidant for transporting
grain from Ackley, Iowa, to Chicago, Illinois. The cause was
tried in the court below without a jury, and upon an agreement as
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to the facts, judgment was rendered for the defendant for cost3.
Plaintiffs appealed.
Brown &-Corney, for appellants.

John 1?. Duncombe, for appellee.
appears from the agreed statement of facts
IOTHROCK, J.-It
that between the eleventh day of April A. D. 1875, and the fourteenth day of April 1876, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant
at Ackley, Iowa, to be shipped to Chicago, Illinois, through
defendant, 129 car loads of wheat, and the defendant fixed theprice and charged for the freight thereon from Ackley to Chicago,
37 cents per 100 pounds, or $74 per car load of 20,000 pounds; and
between April 14th 1876, and March 11th, 1878, 120 cars more,
for which the defendant received and charged for shipment the
same rate. The grain was loaded at Ackley in cars furnished by the
defendant and carried through in bulk to Chicago in a continuous
shipment. All of the cars were billed through from Ackley, Iowa,
to Chicago, Illinois, and the defendant fixed the rate of freight
thus charged, and gave plaintiffs through shipping receipts to
Chicago. It is claimed that the freight thus charged, and paid by
the plaintiffs, was in excess of that authorized by the laws of Iowa
at that time in force; that the distance from Ackley by defendant's
road to Dubuque, on the Iowa state line, is 132 miles, and the
distance from Dubuque to Chicago by defendant's line is 202 miles,
making a total distance through both states of 334 miles, and that
the rate of freight fixed by the law of Illinois was at that time less
than the rate fixed by the statute of Iowa. Damages are claimed
for the difference between what was authorized by the law of Iowa
to be charged for the transportation for the whole distance; also, for
attorney's fees for prosecuting the action.
It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that the law of Iowa
then in force [being chapter 68 of the Acts of the Fifteenth General Assembly], by its plain language and meaning, had no application to contracts made for the transportation of freight into other
states. Section 3 of that act, so far as applicable to this case, is as
follows: "The tariff of rates established in the following schedule
shall be considered the basis on which to compute the compensation
for transporting freight, goods, merchandise or property over any
kind of railroad within this state. * * *" Some of us think this
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language excludes contracts for the transportation of freights to
points without the state. But as the plaintiffs claimed that these
were contracts made in Iowa for through shipments to Chicago,
and that by taking the law of Illinois to the law of Iowa, thus making it one continuous haul, the rate for the continuous haul, being
in excess of that authorized by the law of Iowa, may be recovered
back. We think it is not necessary to put a construction upon the
law of this state in this regard, but rest our decision upon another
ground.
It is claimed by the defendant that whatever construction may
be put on the law of this state, it can have no application to shipments of freight from this state to other states, because state legislation of that character is void, as being contrary to article 1, sect.
8, of the Constitution of the United States, which confers upon
Congress the power "1to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states." Now, if this position be correct, it is
needless to enter into a discussion of all the questions so elaborately
and ably discussed by counsel in this case. If the law of Iowa,
conceding that it contemplates the control or regulation of shipments of freights to other states, is in that particular void as being
an infraction of the Federal Constitution, it cannot be enforced, and
the defendant was not bound to obey it, and could fix its own
freight tariff, and the plaintiffs cannot recover for a violation of the
statute, whatever other rights they may have.
It is not claimed that the fixing of rates of freight shipped from
one state into another is not a regulation of commerce. "Any
regulation of the transportation of freight upon the high seas, the
lakes, the rivers, or upon the railroads or other artificial channels
of communication, is a regulation of commerce itself:" City of
Council Bluffs v. K. C., St. J.
C. B. Railroad Co., 45 Iowa
338. This has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of the
United States: Reading Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall.
232; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; State of Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 Id. 421; Gibbons v. Oyden, 9
Wheat. 1.
There is a line of cases determined in the Supreme Court of the
United States which hold that it is competent for the states, in the
absence of legislation by Congress, to legislate respecting interstate
commerce, but those cases have been such as relate to bridges or
dams across streams wholly within a state, police laws relating to
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pilots of vessels, health laws, and the like. See Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.
713. But that court has always held that the power to enact laws
upon subjects in their nature national, and not merely local, is
exclusively with Congress. In (Jooley v. Boardof Wardens, supra,
it is said: "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature
national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by Congress.
.That the act of this state, assuming that its object and purpose
was to control and regulate the shipments of freight to other states,
is of the character last defined, appears to be very clear, and we
are not without authority upon this question: and from a source
which so far as questions involving the construction of the Federal
Constitution are involved, are binding tupon this court and all other
courts in the Union.
The legislature of the state of Pennsylvania enacted a law
imposing a tax upon freight taken up within the state and carried
out of it, or taken up without the state and carried within it. The
Pennsylvania Railroad Company refused to pay the tax, upon the
ground that the law was unconstitutional and void, being in conflict
with the Constitution of the United States which ordains that
"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states." In qZhe State Jireight
Tax, 15 Wall. 232, involving the validity of this act, it was
held that the tax imposed thereby was upon the freight carried,
and that. it was a regulation of interstate transportation or commerce among the states.
The court in that case say: "If,
then, this is a tax upon freight carried between states, and a tax
'because of its transportation, and if such tax is in effect a regulation of interstate commerce, the conclusion seems to be inevitable that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States." It is there further said: " The rule has been asserted
with great clearness, that whenever the subjects over which a power
to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or
admit of -one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Truly, transportation of passengers, or merchandise through a state, or from one state to another, is of this
nature."
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In tHenderson v. MTayor of New York, 92 U. S. 272, the following language is used: "It is said, however, that under the decisions
of this court there is a kind of neutral ground, especially in that
covered by the regulation of commerce, which may be occupied by
the state, and its legislation be valid, so long as it interferes with no
act of Congress or treaty of the United States. Such a proposition
is supported by the opinions of several of the judges in The Passenger Cases; by the decisions of this court in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How.299, and by the cases of Crandallv. -Nevada,
6 Wall. 35, and Wilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Id. 713. But this
doctrine has been always controverted in this court, and has seldom
if ever been stated without dissent. These decisions, however, all
agree that under the commercial clause of the Constitution, or
within its compass, there are powers which, from their nature, are
exclusive in Congress, and in the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, it is said that "whatever subjects of this power are in their
nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress."
In the case of Railroad Co. v. i1faryland, 21 Wall. 456, it was
determined that the charter of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company for constructing and operating a branch railroad from
Baltimore to Washington, upon a stipulation contained in the
charter that the company should pay the state of Maryland onefifth of the amount of money received for the transportation of
passengers, was not an infraction of the Federal Constitution as being
a regulation of interstate commerce. It is there said: "The
exercise of power on the part of the state is very different from
the imposition of a tax or duty upon the movements or operations
of commerce between the states. Such an imposition, whether
relating to persons or goods, we have decided the states cannot
make, because it would be a regulation of commerce between the
states in a matter in which uniformity is essential to the rights of
all, and therefore requiring the exclusive legislation of Congress."
In that case the state of Maryland in grantifig the charter, expressly
reserved the right to part of the earnings of the road, and the
power to do so was upheld upon the principle that if the state had
itself built the road and operated it, it would have been entitled to
its earnings.
The cases of ]JTunn v. Dlinois,94 U. S.113; C., B. fQ. Railroad
VOL. XXXI.-48
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Co. v. Iowa, Id. 155, and .Peik v. C. & N. W. Railroad Co., Id.
164, do not appear to us to sanction the validity of acts of the
state legislature regulating the transportation of freight and passengers between the states. They merely determine the power
of the state to fix reasonable warehouse charges, and reasonable
charges for transportation of freight within the boundaries of the
states respectively, and that where such power is exercised, although
it may incidentally affect commerce between the states, yet the
laws of the states are not regulations of interstate commerce
because of such incidental results. That it was not intended in
those cases to approve legislation like that under consideration in
this case, it appears to us is conclusively shown by the reasoning
in the later cases of Hall v. IDeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, and Raiboad
Co. v. Husen, Id. 465.
It is urged with great earnestness that these contracts of shipment are entire contracts, and having been entered into in Iowa,
the laws of this state entered into and become a part of the contracts, and the statute fixing the rate governed the price for the
entire distance. This rule is, no doubt, correct when applied to a
valid enactment of the legislature of the state where a contract is
entered into, and no one doubts the power of a common carrier to
bind itself to ship freight beyond state lines, or even to foreign
countries and beyond the terminus of its line of transportation.
Under such a contract it is everywhere held that the carrier is
bound to perform his contract and is liable for loss by negligence.
But this position of counsel, it seems to us, begs the question, because if the law of Iowa, under consideration, is an unauthorized
regulation of interstate commerce, it cannot enter into and become
part of any contract. This position of counsel forcibly illustrates
the correctness of our conclusions, that the law in question, if held
to have been intended to operate upon interstate traffic, is directly
and palpably contrary to the Constitution of the United States. If
the law entered into and become part of the contract of shipment we
would have a law of Iowa which would control and regulate the
transportation of freight not only to the remotest parts of the states
and territories of this country, but extending to all nations of the
earth to which lines of common carriers extend, and to which local
carriers may undertake to transport goods. That such legislation
is national in its character, it seems to us, must be conceded.
If we are correct in these views there is but little more necessary
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to be said in this case. The plaintiffs claim to recover because the
amount of freight money exacted by the defendant was in excess
of the rate fixed by the law of Iowa. The contract of shipment
was an entirety. It cannot be severed and made to apply partly
to the shipment in Iowa and partly to that in Illinois. It was the
right of the defendant to disregard any laws which sought to regulate shipments to points without the state, and make its own contracts. Having done so, the plaintiffs cannot recover under any
state law, simply because it is void, as being repugnant to the Federal Constitution. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any relief,
independent of the statute, we do not determine, because that
question is not in this case. Affirmed.
BECK, J., dissenting.-I am unable to concur in the arguments
and conclusions announced in the preceding opinion of the court
prepared by Mr. Justice ROTHROCK. The case is one of gteat
importance, as the decision affects the interest of all the people of
the state. This consideration has stimulated me in its careful
examination with the purpose of preparing an extended discussion
of the doctrines which, in my opinion, should control the decision
of the important questions involved in the case. But I am unable,
within the limited time which other judicial duties permit me to
devote to the case, to carry out my purpose, and I am compelled to
limit myself to a brief statement of the principles upon which I
base my dissent to the opinion of the majority of the court.
It is shown by the record before us that the defendant received the grain shipped by plaintiffs for transportation to the city
of Chicago. A contract was thus entered into by the defendant
for the.carriage of the grain from Ackley to Chicago. This contract was made in Ackley, and is therefore subject to the laws of
the state applicable thereto.
It is competent for the state to enact the statute in question
unless it should be found to be in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States as a regulation of commerce. The statute is not
in conflict with the Federal Constitution, for the following reasons:
Conceding the statute has the effeqt of regulating commerce,
it is enacted in the exercise of a power which is vested concurrently
in the state and national governments; and as it is not in conflict
with any law of the United States, and as Congress has not enacted
any statute upon its. subject, it cannot be regarded as an encroach-
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ment upon the authority of the general government. Until Congress assume the exercise of authority over the subject of the statute in question, the state is free to legislate upon it.
In my opinion, regulations of commerce which impose burdens and restrictions thereon only, are forbidden to the states by
the Constitution of the United States. The states are free to enact
all laws which will aid in securing the expeditious and cheap transportation of property used in the commerce of the country. Of
this character are statutes providing for the construction of the
mediums of transportation of property, for its protection while in
transit, and for the protection of the means of transportation used
by common carriers. Enactments prescribing the duties and obligations of carriers are of the same character and class. It must
be remembered that railroads do not constitute commerce. They
are means used by commerce. The corporations operating them
are common carriers employed in the commerce of the country.
Burdens, impediments and restrictions may be imposed on commerce by these common carriers. This may be done by unnecessary
delays, and by unreasonable and unjust charges for carrying goods
and the like. Statutes which remove burdens and restrictions imposed in this way upon commerce and which protect it from unjust
exactions by common carriers, are not regulations of conmerce
within the contemplation of the Constitution of the United States.
The statute of the state brought in question in the case is of this
character. It was intended and operated to protect and stimulate
commerce by preventing oppressive and discriminating charges for
the transportation of property used in the commerce of the country.
These conclusions, in my opinion, are based upon doctrines well
established by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
of this court.
The right of the stAe to regulate railway charges has not been admitted in all

charges by its own officers, according to
their views of the necessities of business

Thus it has been decided that

and of justice to the public, without any

the power of a railroad company to

reservation in the charter of legislative

charge for the transportation of passengers and freight is one essential to the
enjoyment of the franchise and must be
presumed to have been the consideration
for which the corporators accepted the
charter, invested their money and assumed the obligations imposed on them;

supervision or control over them, being a
part of the franchise as it was granted,
an act of the legislature which assumes
for the state the right to regulate what
under the charter was granted as an
absolute disci-etion to the corporation,
viz.: the right to adjust its tariff of

and the power to adjust its tariff of

charges for the carriage of passengers

cases.
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and freight, undoubtedly impairs the
obligation of the contract in the sense
of the constitutional prohibition, and is
inoperative and void: P. W. - 3.
Railroad Co. v. Bowers, 4 Houst. 507.
See also Sloan v. Pacific Railroad Co.,
61 Mlo. 24. But in this case it was
decided that, regardless of legislation,
the company was responsible for its
breach of duty as a common carrier in
charging exorbitant freights or making
unjust discriminations ; and see AttorneyGeneral v. Railroad C'ompany, 35 Wis.
428. And Ruggles v. People, 91 Ill.
256, holds that an express grant of
power in a charter of a railway company to fixthe rates of toll to be charged
and to alter and change the same, does
not confer unlimited power, but only the
right to charge reasonable rates, and
what is a maximum rate may be fixed by
the statute.
Other cases, constituting the clear
weight of authority, affirm the constitutionality of regulations as to railway
rates, and such right of regulation by
the state appears now to be firmly
established. Especially when the legislature, in granting the companies their
charters, reserved the right to repeal or
alter them: Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S.
319 ; Peik v. C. J- I. V.Railroad Co.,
94 Id. 165; Munn v. ll1inois, 94 Id.
113; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 Id. 183;
Anerican Coal Co. v. Consol. Coal Co.,
46 Mld. 15; f. 4- M. Railroad Co. v.
Steiner, 61 Ala. 559 ; . 1 Railroad
Co. v. F. Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 369;
C. 4 A. Railroad Co. v. Peoples, 67
Ill.11; People v. Ruggles, 91 Id.
256; Attorney-General v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 428 ; Hinckley v. C.
M. 6- St. P. Railroad Co., 38 Id. 196.
Such regulation by the state is not
prohibited by sect. 8, art. 1, United States
Constitution, which gives power to congress to regulate commerce between the
states and with foreign nations, nor by
sect. 9, art. 1, United States Constitution,
which prohibits preferences to the ports

of one state over those of another.
This provision applies only to th federal
government: .Ann v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113.
The legislature, in prescribing maximum rates of freight charges, may affix
a money penalty-e. g., a fine of $1000
-for
violating the statute fixing the
rates; but no opinion was expressed,
whether the legislature had power to
affix a forfeiture of the company's fran. 6- St. P.
chises as a penalty: St. v.
Railroad Co., 19 Minn. 434.
Statutes regulating and limiting rates
may classify corporations and establish
different rates for different classes, provided the same regulations are made for
all in a like situation, and such statutes
do not conflict with state constitutional
provisions requiring uniformity and
equality in general laws: McAunich v.
.A1. 6- l. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa 338 ;
0., B. 6- Q. Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94
U. S. 155.
The legislature may part with its right
of taxation and afortior with its right to
regulate rates: Sloan v. Pacfic RailroadCo., 61 lo. 24.
And where railway companies are
exempt by their charters from state
regulation as to rates, they may relinquish
their right of exemption, or lose it by
consolidation with, or merger in, other
companies not so exempt: Peik v. C. &N. W. Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 164;
Shields v. Ohio, 95 Id. 319 ; C., H. &
D. Railroad Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St.
126.
So, if a railroad corporation, though
originally chartered without restrictions
as to the right to fix tolls, accepts a limitation or restriction of such powers, on
a valuable consideration, e. g., as one of
the conditions on which it receives aid
from the state, such limitation inheres in
its organic law precisely as if originally
incorporated therein ; and a new corporation, formed by those purchasing its
property, and succeeding only to the
rights of the old, is bound by such limi-
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tations: M. 4- M. Railroad Co. v.
Steiner, 61 Ala. 559.
It has been decided that the rate on
freight " carried over the whole line of
its road," which furnishes the basis for
the additional fifty per cent. allowed by
the regulating act for the transportation
of "local freight," is the rate charged
on freight taken on at one terminus and
discharged at the other; and not the rate
for freight brought from or carried to a
point beyond the termini of the road.
The rate which furnishes the basis on
which local freight charges must be graduated is the rate prevailing at the time
of shipment ; and rates at any particular
time in the past furnish no reliable
guide for ascertaining present rates : Il.
4- 1. Railroad Co. v. Steiner, 61 Ala.
559.
A statute providing that railroad companies "may, for the transportation of
local freight demand and receive, not
exceeding fifty per cent. more than
the rate charged for the transportation
of the same description of freight, over
the whole line of its road," does not authorize the addition of fifty per cent. on
the charge over the whole road, irrespective of the distance, the freight may be
carried, but only an additional fifty per
cent. more per mile, for the distance
local freight is carried, than the per mile
rate charged on goods carried over the
whole line:
. 6- M. Railroad Co. v.
Steiner, 61 Ala. 559.
By an Act of Assembly it. was provided that " rates for toll and transportation may be regulated in such manner
as the company may deem most advisable; provided, that the maximum
charges for toll and transportation shall
not exceed four cents per mile for
freight." A subsequent act amended the
proviso so as to read "average charges
for toll and transportation." It was held
that the company might impose more
than four cents per mile on some charges,
so that by making others less the general
average should not exceed four cents ;

that the adjustment of tolls was not
required to be made so as to bear equally
on each individual, but was to be made
between the whole road and the entire
public who used it; that the requirement
of the statute was satisfied by fixing
different charges per mile for different
kinds of freight; that the company may
discriminate in favor of longer distances;
that " average charges" are charges at
a mean rate ascertained by dividing the
entire receipts by the whole quantity of
tonnage, reduced to a common standard
of tens moved one mile ; that the charges
against the plaintiff, averaged by the
whole amount of business of the company, were less than four per cent. ; by
that done for him alone they were more
than five per cent., and that the former
was the proper estimate, and the charges
were not excessive : Hersh v. A. C. Railroad Co., 74 Penn. St. 18.1.
In Wisconsin, a railway company cannot, by showing that the amount charged
was no more than a reasonable compensation for the service rendered, recover more than the maximum rate fixed
by law : C., 1lf. 4- St. . Railroad Co.
v. Acldey, 94 U. S. 179.
A statutory provision that no reduction shall be made in the rates of fare
and charges for freight allowed to railway companies organized under such
statute, unless where their net profits for
the previous ten years amount to ten per
cent. on their capital, is in the nature of
a contract and binding on the state.
There are railway companies who have
not relinquished their right to be governed by such statutory provision, and
not having realized a net profit of ten per
cent. on their capital for the ten years
next preceding the enactment of the statute they are not bound by provisions of
the act reducing their rates of freight or
fare: Iron Railroad Co. v. Lawrence F.
Co., 29 Ohio St. 208.
The grounds of the right of the government to regulate the prices of transportation are several :
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I. PUBLIC UsE.-The devotion-of the
property of a person or corporation to a
public use warrants governmental regulation of such use and the prices chargeable for it. See Lord H.,LE, Do Jure
Mlaris, I Harg. Law Tracts 6; Blot v.
Stennelt, 8 T. R. 606 ; Aldnutt v. Tng!as,
12 East 527 ; Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala.
(N. S.) 140; 1aunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, and cases supra.
What is a public use of property?
Chief Justice WAITE says, somewhat
vaguely, that "property does become
clothed with a public interest when used
in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at
large;" and he continues, "when, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest, he, in
effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has
thus created. He may withdraw his
grant by discontinuing the use; but so
long as he maintains the use, he must
submit to the control: iann v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113. He held that the business
of a common carrier was so "affected
with a public interest" as to be, on this
ground, subject to legislative regulation.
So also were held ferrymen, hackmen,
wharfingers, bakers, millers, warehousemen and innkeepers.
FiEL, J., dissented ; said he, "there
is no business or enterprise involving
expenditures to any extent which is not
of public consequence, and which does
not affect the community at large. There
is no trade or manufacture, and no avocation which does not, in a greater or
less extent, affect the community and in
which the public has an interest in the
sense used by the court:" Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181, 185.
1The public," said he again, "1is interested in the manufacture of cotton,
woollen and silken fabrics, in the construction of machinery, in the printifig
and publication of books and periodicals,

and in the making of utensils of every
variety, useful and ornamental; indeed
there is hardly an enterprise or business
engaging the attention and labor of any
considerable portion of the community in
which the public has not an interest, in
the sense in which that term is used by
the court :" Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
141 ; and he thought the principle
of the court "subversive of the rights
of private property." Whether or not
this dissent rests upon solid foundations,
the decisions of the courts pretty clearly
establish the fact that in the eye of the
law the property of railways is devoted
to the use of the public, is "affected
with a public interest," and that, therefore, its use and the prices chargeable
therefor are subject to regulation by the
state.
The Supreme Court of Texas, speaking of the distinction between devoting
property to a private and to a public use,
decided that a business, which is strictly
juris privati, does not become jutispublid, by reason of the fact that those carrying it on have become incorporated by
the legislature, nor merely by reason of
the extent of such business. If the magnitude of a particular business is such,
and the persons affected by it are so
numerous that the interest qf society demands that it should be relegated to the
-class of occupations juris publici, the exercise of such power is for the legislature
(if not restrained by the Constitution)
and not for the judicial department.
In the absence of legislation a person
who has not put his property and services
to public use, by the character of the
business in which he is engaged, does not
do so by reason of combination with
others in a like business, though he is
enabled thereby to exact from those who
may employ him unreasonable and extortionate charges for services rendered :
Ladd v. Southern C. P. 4- M. Co., 12
Leg. News 418.
II.

USE

OF PUBLIc

PROPERTY.-
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And where several railways run to a
city, a monopoly is established of railway transportation to that city where
they combine and form "pools," or
"freight associations." These "pools"
or similar combinations are clearly illegal; and as monopolies, any railway
or combination of railways, are subject
to legislative control.
But railway regulative legislation is
at present insufficient and defective.
Only about fifteen of the states have
attempted it to any great extent, and
their legislation reaches only to domestic
traffic. The larger portion of railway
business, interstate traffic, is subject to
no regulation. The state governments
cannot regulate it. The national government has not done so. Nor are all
the subjects proper for regalation been
provided for, even in those states which
In. MONOPOLY OR COMBINATION. have legislated most vigorously against
-When any person or corporation has railways. Legislation for the prevenobtained the sole power of dealing in tion of strikes by railway employees,
any species of goods, or of dealing with and the consequent stoppage of railway
a country or market, by engrossing the facilities, has not yet been attempted.
articles in the market, or by license Nor are there any regulations as to the
from the government, the latter has management and funding of the vast
always asserted and exercised its right and rapidly increasing railway debt.
to regulate and control such person or Nor is there any system of inspection of
corporation so as to stop and prevent railway equipments and appliances.
extortion agd oppression. "A monop- Such inspection should be made by the
oly, it is said, hath three incidents mis- state. It would prevent such disasters
chievous to the public: 1. The raising, as that at Ashtabula bridge--and in
of the price; 2. The commodity will passing it may be noted that bridge
not be so good; 3. The impoverishing accidents during the year 1881 were
of poor artificers:" Darcy v. Allen, 11 double in number those of previous
Coke 84. And monopolous grants were years. Safety to persons and property
decided to be illegal. In 1624 they in transit over railways-fairness and
were abolished by statute in England. evenhanded justice to the public that
It would be strange if the legislature patronizes railways, demand their
had the power to abolish monopolies but reasonable control and regulation by
could not regulate them. The greater state and federal governments. It is
power certainly includes the less. As hoped that such regulation will not be
to points with which a single railroad is postponed.
ADLBET HAMILTOv.
the only means of communication, such
Chicago.
railroad is an undoubted monopoly.
The property of railway companies is
largely public, and belongs to the government, by which it is, therefore, subject to regulation.
For example, a
railway company's franchises, its right
to construct and to operate its railroad
belongs to the government. It is only
held by the railway corporation in trust
for the public benefit. It is in all cases
valuable, and in many instances enormously valuable. Under it the companies condemn and take private property for their line. The company is as
to this right the agent of the government
conferring it, and is bound as much as
its principal to use the right for the
common welfare. Therefore, as the
agent of the government, possessing and
using public property, a railway company is subject to regulation.

LANGDON v. UNION MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.

Circuit Court, IEastern -Districtof Michigan,
LANGDON v. UNION MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
A person may insure his own life and make the policy payable to any one, though
such payee has no interest in the life of the insured. Hence, where a policy was
taken out upon the life of one, and made payable to another (who had no legal
interest in it) in case he survived the assured, and there was strong evidence tending to show that the transaction was a mere wager, Reld, that it was properly left
to the jury to say whether the policy was obtained in good faith, and not for the
purpose of speculating on the hazard of a life in which the plaintiff had no interest.
An applicant for a policy was asked the following question: " Has any application ever been made either to this or any other company, upon which a policy was
not issued ?" Held, that a negative answer was not improper, although an applica_
tion had been made to another company which had not been finally passed upon by
that company.
An applicant made a full statement of all the facts regarding the name of
his usual medical attendant to the sub-agent who took the application, and the subagent, putting his own construction upon the facts, filled in the wrong name: Reld,
that the company could not take advantage of the mistake.

THIS was an action upon a policy of life insurance upon the
life of Augustus E. Baker, "for the sole and separate use and
benefit of his brother-in-law, William W. Langdon. But in case

of his previous death to revert to the insured."

The facts in

relation to this policy were substantially as follows: The agent
of the defendant solicited Langdon, the plaintiff, to insure his life

in his company.

This application plaintiff declined, but said to the

agent that he might go to his brother-in-law, Baker, and get -himto
make an application for a policy, and the plaintiff would pay the
premiums. Baker was the plaintiff's brother-in-law, but he had

no other interest in his life.

The court left it to the jury to say

whether the policy was taken out in good faith by Baker, with a
designation of the plaintiff as a person to receive the money, or
whether it was intended by the plaintiff as a wagering contract
upon Baker's life. The jury returned a verdict for the amount

of the policy.
Motion was made for a new trial upon the ground of misdirection

upon this and other points stated in the opinion.
3loore & Canfield, for plaintiff.

H. H. Duffield, for defendant.
BRowN, D. J.-The policy in this case purported upon its face to

be taken out by the insure upoA his own life, but the evidence
VOL. XXXI.-49

LANGDON v. UNION MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.

shows that it was taken at the suggestion of his brother-in-law, who
sent the agent of the company to Baker, and paid all the premiums
upon the policy. It was made payable to the plaintiff in case he
survived Baker. Baker's life had previously been insured in other
companies for plaintiff's benefit to the amount of $6000. He had
also made application to the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Company for a policy of $3000, which -was rejected. Upon the
trial, the question was left to the jury to say whether the policy was
obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculation on the
hazard of a life in which the plaintiff had no legal interest. It was
thought that the fact that the policy provided in express terms
that in case of the previous death of the plaintiff it should revert
to the insured, and hence that the plaintiff's interest was contingent
upon his surviving Baker, was some evidence to go to the jury that
the policy was taken out in good faith. It was certainly consistent
with an understanding that the plaintiff wished to hold the policy
during his life as security for the premiums, with a resulting trust
in favor of Baker's wife, 'who was his own sister.
It is now well settled in the federal courts that a party cannot
take out an insurance upon his own life and assign the policy, either
contemporaneously with its execution or subsequently, to a person
having no legal interest in his life, although the decisions of the
state courts upon this point are conflicting: Warnock v. Davis,
104 U. S. 775; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643.
But there is no case, to my knowledge, which holds that a party
may not insure his own life and make the policy payable to any one
he may select, though such person have no legal interest in his life.
This point was first held in the case of Campbell v. New England
HAfut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381. The policy in this case was
taken out by Campbell upon his life, payable to him, his executors,
etc., for the benefit of the plaintiff, in very nearly the same terms
as are contained in the policy under consideration. The only
substantial difference in the two cases is that the premium in this
case was paid by the assured, and not by the beneficiary. So in the
_Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 236, it was said to be
"beyond question that a person has an insurable interest in his own
life, and that he may effect such insurance, and appoint any one to
receive the money, in case of his death during the existence of such
a policy." This was an accident policy in similar terms. Although
this exact question has not often been decided, the intimations of
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the courts are uniformly in the same direction. Lemon v. Phcenix
Hut. Life ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294, 302; Guardian Mut. Life
Ins. -0o. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35; American L. d Hf. Ins. Co. v.
Bobertshaw, 26 Penn. St. 189; .airchild v. N
. Hut. Life
Ass'n, 51 Vt. 624; Olmstead v. Keyes, 11 Ins. Law J. 55.
Hence, the production of the policy, proof of payment of premiums, and of the insured's death, were sufficient to make a Prima
facie case for the plaintiff without evidence of interest in him.
The facts, however, that the policy was taken out by Baker at the
plaintiff's instigation, and that the premiums were paid by plaintiff,
taken in connection with Baker's position in life, his total want of
means, and the further fact that the plaintiff had obtained policies
upon his life to the amount of $6000 in addition to this, were
strong evidence to show that the transaction was a mere wager upon
his life, nothwithstanding the fact of Baker's reversionary interest.
The case was submitted to the jury in supposed conformity to the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Schzeffer, 94 U. S.67. See, also, .. ,tna Life Ins. Co. v. Prance,
Id. 561; Brockway v. Hut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 10 Ins. Law J.
763-769; Wainwrigh~t v. Bland, 1 Moody & R. 481; Swick v.
ffome Life Ins. Co., 2 Dill. 160. The mere payment of the premiums by plaintiff is not conclusive evidence that the policy was
taken out by him: Triston v. Hardey, 14 Beav. 232; Armstrong
v. HMut. Life Ins. Co., 13 Reporter 711. Were it an original
question, I should be disposed to say that a policy taken out by one
person for the benefit of another could no more be supported without evidence of legal interest in the beneficiary, than a policy
assigned to one having no interest in the life. But a large number
of cases seem to make this distinction, and I know of none which
reject it. Under all the circumstances, I think the question was
properly submitted to the jury.
There was no error in the charge respecting the prior application
made to the Massachusetts company. In the application in this
case the following question was asked: "Has any application ever
been made, either to this or any other company, upon which a policy
was not issued ?" The answer was, "No."
The evidence showed
that upon the day before Baker made this application he signed a
written application for a policy in the Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Company, and submitted to an examination by the surgeon of the company. This examination proving unsatisfactory,
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the surgeon certified upon the back of the application that the risk
was an unfit one. The application was then returned to the general
agent of the company, who forwarded it to the home office of the
company in Springfield, Massachusetts, where it was rejected. If
the question had been, "Has any application ever been made to
this or any other company upon which a policy has not been
issued," I should have had little difficulty in holding that the
answer was false; but I think that there is a distinction between
the words " was not" and "has not been" issued. I think a person of ordinary intelligence might answer "no" to the first form of
the question, supposing that the company desired to know whether
an application had been made and rejected. But the application
in this case had not been rejected. The examining surgeon had
no authority beyond his certificate as to the physical condition of
the party examined. Notwithstanding this certificate, the company
might have issued the policy if it had chosen to do so. It did not,
in fact, reject the application until some time after the application
in this case had been made to the defendant. The question as put
was somewhat ambiguous, and I think it contemplates, when fairly
and reasonably construed, that the company desired to know whether
an application had been made and rejected. So long as the matter
was still pending, it does not seem to me that a negative answer to
the question was an improper one.
There was no error in the refusal of the defendant's request that
Baker's statement of his age in the application was entitled to no
greater weight than any other statement of his as to his age. The
request asked for a charge upon the weight of testimony. Parties
have no right to this. The court may, in its discretion, comment
upon the testimony, and even express an opinion upon it, and upon
the weight to which the several items of testimony are entitled, but
counsel have no legal right to such instructions.
Baker did misstate the name of his medical attendant, and upon
the first trial this misstatement was held fatal to a recovery ; but
upon the last trial it appeared that he made a full and fair statement
of the facts regarding his medical attendant to Mr. Hitchcock, the
person who took his application, stating that Dr. Loring had been
his medical attendant in Providence, and up to the time he removed
to Detroit; that since he had been here Dr. Book had treated him
for a disorder of the nose, and, being evidently in some doubt as to
what the correct answer was to the question, he left it to Hitchcock to
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make the answer. He, it seems, put his own construction upon his
language, and advised him, under that state of facts, to answer that
Dr. Loring was his medical attendant.
It is claimed by the defence that the company is not estopped by
this statement, because Hitchcock was not the agent of the company,
but a sub-agent, holding his appointment from the general agent of
the company, Mr. Patton. Had Hitchcock been the general agent
of the company, there can be but little doubt that the case would
have fallen within the decision in Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall.
232. While it is true that Hitchcock did not hold his appointment
from the company, but from Mr. Patton, the contract between Patton and the company, produced upon the motion for a new trial,
shows that it was contemplated that Patton should appoint subagents, whose duty it would undoubtedly be to take applications.
Besides, it is a well-known custom of insurance agents to employ
sub-agents of this kind to take applications, which are forwarded by
the general agent of the company and upon which policies are constantly issued. Under such circumstances it seems to me, upon principle as well as authority, that the company ought not to say that
the construction put by a sub-agent upon a statement made by the
insured as to his medical attendant (a statement made in entire
'good faith) was false. . I do not contend but that if the statement
was false in fact and designedly so, or if it was made with intent
to impose upon or mislead the company, the mere knowledge of the
sub-agent would prevent the company from taking advantage of it.
But where, as in this case, the applicant states all the facts, and
the sub-aigent puts his own construction upon them, I think the
company is estopped: Woodbury Savings Bank v. Charter Oak
Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 517 ; Mayers v. Hut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law
J. 662; Bodine v. Exct. Fire Ins." Co., 51 N. Y. 117; 'Fan
Schoick v. Niagara Ins. Co., 68 Id. 434; Strong v. Stewart, 9
Heisk. 137; Furnas v. Prankman, 6 Neb. 429; Brown v. Ins.
Co., 45 Mo. 221; Am. Ins. Co. v. Lesem, 39 Ill. 314. Themotion
for a new trial must be denied.
it is a general principle of law, applicable alike in cases of fire, life and
marine insurance, that itis absolutely
necessary to the validity of the contract
of insurance that the person insured
should have some interest in the subject
matter of the contract. Such interest

must be what is known as an "insurable
interest," otherwise it is evident that the
contract is a mere wager between the
parties, prohibited by the clearest dictates
of public policy. In no class of insurance cases does the rule above laid down
apply with more force than in cases of
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life insurance. That the duration of a
man's life should be permitted to become
the subject of a wager is of itself
a monstrous proposition. But when in
connection with the matter, we consider
that it is directly to the interest of the
insured in such case that the life in question should terminate, to sustain the
contract seems like holding out a premium
to commit murder. Very forcible are
the views expressed by the court in an
opinion in a recent case upon this subject.
"It is a general rule of law that no
one can procure valid insurance on a
life unless he has an interest in that life.
I may insure my own life, for I have an
interest in it. But an entire stranger
to me, one who has no interest in my life
as a creditor or otherwise, cannot take out
a valid policy on it. Should he procure
such policy the law would condemn it as
a mere wager, a bet on my life, a gambling contract, and there could be no
recovery thereon. This rule prevails
not in the interest of insurance companies
or out of regard for them. The rule has
its foundation in good morals and sound
publicpolicy. Ithasbeenwell said of such
wager policies that ' if valid they would
not only afford facilities for a demoralizing system of gaming, but furnish strong
temptations to the party interested to
bring about if possible the event insured
against.' The annals of crime furnish
more than one instance where murder
has been perpetrated by the holders of
such policies, that they might reap the
fruits of speculative insurance upon the
life of their victim. If an entire stranger
to me were permitted to take out insurance on my life, his sole interest, you
must perceive, would be in my speedy
death. The law, therefore, wisely takes
from him the temptation to bring about
the event by forbidding such contract.
The evils of gambling in such policies
are also apparent and great, and therefore
the law will not sanction insurance
obtained for the purpose of speculating

upon the hazard of a life in which the
assured has no interest :" Brockway v.
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 9 Fed.
Rep. 249.
The law, therefore, refuses to enforce a
policy of life insurance knowingly issued
to one who was not of kindred to the
subject of the insurance nor in any way
interested in his life: Mflutual Benefit
Association v. Hoyt, 10 Ins. L. J. 626.
Generally where one person takes out
a policy on the life of another he is bound
to prove affirmatively, In suing on the
policy, that he had an insurable interest :
GuardianMutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan,
80 Ill. 35.
Where, however, the company defendant in its pleadings sets up some other
defence, it is not at liberty subsequently
to aver and depend upon a lack of insurable interest in the plaintiff : Forbes v.
American Mlutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Gray
(Mass.) 249.
The question next arises as to who
may be considered as having an insurable
interest in the life of another person.
This is a question very difficult to
answer. In a recent case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, FIFLD, J.,
thus lays down the rule: "It is not
easy to define with precision what will
in all cases constitute an insurable
interest, so as to take the contract out
of the class of wager polieies. It may
be stated generally, however, to be such
an interest, arising from the relations of
the party obtaining the insurance, either
as creditor of or surety for the assured,
or from the ties of blood or marriage to
him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary
that the expectation of advantage or
benefit, should be always capable of
pecuniary estimation ; for a parent has
an insurable interest in the life of his
child and a child in the life of his parent;
a husband in the life of his wife and a
wife in the life of her husband. The
natural affection in cases of this kind is
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considered as more powerful-as opera- the same remains in full force: Connecting more efficaciously-to protect the life ticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94
of the insured than any other consideraU. S. 457.
tion. But in all cases there must he a reaA wife has such an interest in a policy
sonable ground founded upon the relations taken out for her benefit'upon her husof the parties to each other, either band's life that the riglits under the same
pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to ex- will pass to her children if her husband
pect some benefit or advantage from the predecease her: .Hutson v. Merrifield,
continuance of the life of the assured, 51 Ind. 24.
otherwise the contract is a mere wager,
A woman engaged to be married to a
by which the party taking the policy is man has, it seems, an insurable interest
directly interested in the early death of
in his life; and this is but reasonable,
the assured. Such policies have a tendency considering the prospective advantages
to create a desire forthe event. They which will accrue to her if he keeps his
are, therefore, independently of any contract: Chisholm v. N¢ational Capital
statute on the subject, condemned as Lffe Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213.
being against public policy :" Warnock
v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775.
PARENT ANe CHILD. It was origiWe may now proceed to consider the nally decided in England that a father
adjudications on this subject.
bad not an insurable interest in the life
PAaT HAS INSURABLE INTEItEST IN
nis owx LIFE.
Every man is to be
regarded as having an insurable interest
in his own life. He may therefore effect
an insurance thereon which, in the event
of there being no other specification, will
be payable on the death of the insured
to his personal representatives.
HUSBAND AND WIPE. A wife has an
insurable interest in her husband's life
arising out of the right and expectation
on her part of support and maintenance
from him as long as he remains alive:
Gambs v. Covenant Life Ins. Co., 50
Mo. 44; St. John v. American Life Ins.
Co., 2 Duer 419 ; Baker v. Union
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. 283;
McKee v. Phenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383;
Equitable Life Ins. Society v. Paterson,
41 Ga. 338 ; Holabird v. Atlantic Ins.
Co., 2 Duer 166.
A husband has also, it would seem,
an insurable interest in his wife's life,
arising out of the right which he has to
her society and assistance. Where the
parties are legally married at the time
the policy is taken out a subsequent
absolute divorce will not invalidate it, but

of his son: Halford v.1iymer, 10 B. &
C. 725. Many decisions in this country
are in opposition to this doctrine:
Mitchell v. Union Life Ins. Co., 45 Me.
104 ; Loomis v. Eagle Life and Health
Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396; Hoyt v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Penn.
St. 154; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457; Williams v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 31
Iowa 541.
But in most if not all of these cases,
the dependency of the parent on the
child for support was shown to exist to a
greater or less extent. They cannot,
therefore, be considered as quite conclusive on the point that the relationship alone constitutes an insurable
interest. It seems, however, that a
mother has an insurable interest in the
life of her son, irrespective of the question whether she is or is not dependent
upon him: Reif v. Union Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 17 Ins. Chron. 13. A. child
has not an insurable interest in the
life of the parent, unless his dependency
on him for support be shown, or at least
some direct advantage likely to flow
from the continuance of the parent's
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life: Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hogan, 80 Ill. 35.
The citation above given from Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, seems to
imply that the mere relationship of child
to parent, or of parent to child, constitutes of itself a sufficient insurable
interest in each ,on the life of the other.
We submit, however, that the adjudged
cases do not warrant such a conclusion.
No settled criterion has been laid
down in the books. We would suggest
that eventually the law may be settled
by a consideration of whether, in any
case, positive pecuniary benefit is accruing to the insured by reason of the continuance of the life in question, or
whether, in any case, the insured could
legally call upon the party upon whose
life the policy is effected to contribute to
his support. Either or both of these
elements is necessary to constitute an
insurable interest. If neither of them
is present, it is submitted that no case
has as yet decided that an insurable
interest exists.
OTHER RIAT ONs. The principles
above laid down apply with equal force
in the case of moire remote relatives.
A brother has no insurable interest in
the life of a brother as such: Lewis v.
Piwenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 39 Conn.
100. Nor has an uncle in the life of his
nephew: Singleton v. St. Louis Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 66 Mo. 63. A sister has
an insurable interest in the life of her
brother upon whom she is dependent for
support: Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115.
And in some cases it seems even although this element of dependence 'be
not present: .Etna Life Ins. Co. v.
France, 94 U. S. 561; Goodwin v.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73
N. Y. 430.
PARTNERs. One partner has, in certain cases, an insurable interest in the
life of his copartner, as, for example,
where he has contributed the capital and

his copartner the skill : Valton v. National Loan Fund Association Society, 20
N. Y. 32. And where one party furnishes to another the outfit for a trading
or mining venture, under an agreement
to share the profits, the first-named
party has an insurable interest in the
life of the other: Mlorrell v. Trenton
Mutual Life and Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush.
282 ; Hoyt v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
3 Bosw. 440; Miller v. Eagle Life and
Health Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith 268;
Bevin v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 23 Conn. 244; Trenton Mutual
Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4
Zab. (N. J.) 576.
Where a
MASTE
AND SERVANT.
master has hired a skilled servant for a
certain term in advance, he has an insurable interest in the life of the servant: Hebdon v. West, 3 Best & Smith
578.
DEBTOR AsND

CREITOR.

A cred-

itor has an insurable interest in the life
of his debtor, at least to the extent of
his debt, and the policy will remain in
force notwithstanding the Statute of
Limitations may have run against the
claim: Rawls v. American Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282; Brockway v.
Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 9 Fed. Rep.
249; Dalby v. India and London Life
Ins. Association, 15 C. B. 365. A
creditor may not, however, insure the
life of his debtor for an amount largely
in excess of his debt: Fox v. Pennsylvania lutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Big. L. &
A. Ins. Cas. 458 ; Morrell v. Trenton
Miutual Life and FireIns. Co., 10 Cush.
282.
MAY A PARTY INSURE HIS OWN
IzFE

POP

THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER?

A person may clearly take out a policy
of insurance on his own life, payable to
and for the benefit of a creditor or any
other person having an insurable interest in that life: American Life and
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Health Ins. Co. v. .Robertshaw, 26 Penn. may do so to the extent that such other
St. 189. He may provide, therefore, *person has an insurable interest in his
that out of the policy the amount of the life; but the question whether he may
debt shall first be paid to the creditor, assign it to one having no such interest,
and the balance to the debtor's family: is extremely difficult of solution.
Some authorities distinctly decide that
American Life and Health Ans. Co. v.
Robertshaw, supra. It is also, of course, he may so assign it: Valton v. National
common for a party to take out a policy Fund Life Association Co., 20 N. Y.
himself, payable to and for the benefit 32; St. John v. American Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 13 Id. 31 ; Fairchildv. North
of his wife and children.
May, however, a party take out a Eastern Mutual Life Association, 51 Vt.
policy on his own life payable to one not 625. These proceed upon the principle
that a man may do what he pleases with
having an insurable interest therein?
his own, and that since the policy bethat
settle
The principal case seems to
he can, and there are many dicta in sup- longs absolutely to him he may dispose
port of this proposition : Campbell v. of it as he sees proper.
Other authorities hold that there can
New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 98
Mass. 381; Lemon v. .Phcnix Mutual be no such assignment: Fanklin Life
Life Ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294; Connec- Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116;
ticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Sefton, 53 Id.
94 U. S. 457; Olmstead v. Kreyes, 11 380. "All the objections," says the
Ins. L. J. 55; Provident Life Ins. and court in the case just above cited, 11that
Inv. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 236 ; Fair- exist against the issuing of a policy to
child v. North Eastern Mutual Life Asso- one upon the life of another in whose life
the former has no insurable interest,
ciation, 51 Vt. 625.
These cases are, however, clearly con- seem to us to exist against his holding
fined to instances where the party him- such policy by mere purchase and asself pays the premium, and is the real signment from another. In either case
actor in the transaction. Even then the the holder of such policies is interested
wisdom of the principle may be ques- in the death, rather than in the life of
tioned, as it undoubtedly puts tempta- the party assured. The law ought to
tion in the way of the party beneficially be, and we think it clearly is, opposed
interested to terminate the life insured. to such speculations in human life. In
Such a transaction cannot, in any event, our opinion no one should hold a policy
be made the cover for a mere gambling upon the life of another in whose life
venture. Where, therefore, the party he has no insurable interest at the time
whose life is insured does not act wholly he acquired the policy, whether the
on his own account, but by the procure- policy be issued to him directly from
ment and at the instigation of the bene- the insurer, or whether he acquired the
ficiary by whom the premiums are fur- policy by purchase or assignment from
nished, the contract is regarded as a another."
To somewhat the same effect are the
mere wager, and bannot be enforced.
See Wainwright v. Bland, 1 Mee. & W. views expressed on this point by the
Supreme Court of the United States in
32.
Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643, and
May Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775.
ASSIGNMENT OF THE POLICY.
There is, therefore, plainly a hopeless
a person who has taken out a policy of
insurance bonafide on his own life, and conflict of authority on the point. As
in his own name, subsequently assign it to one matter, however, all the cases
A party cannot be allowed
to another party ? Undoubtedly he agree.
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to take out a policy in his own name
and subsequently transfer it to another,
where the clear intent is to evade the
law and enter into a wagering contract.
Where, therefore, the original taking out
of the policy, and the subsequent assignment, constitute one and the same transaction, and are intended to enable one
having no interest in the life insured to
hold an insurance thereon, the contract
is void: Swick v. Home Ins. Co., 2
Dill. 160; Brockway v. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 249 ; Stevens
v. Warren, 101 Mass. 566. In the last
case the court said: "If the assignee
has no interest in the life of the subject
of the insurance which would sustain a
policy to himself, the assignment would
take effect only as a designation by
mutual consent of the contracting parties, of the person who should be entitled
to receive the proceeds when due, instead of the personal representatives of
the assured. And if it should ippear
that the assignment was a cover for a
speculating risk, contravening the general policy of the law, it would not be
sustained."
Whether or not the intention has been
to effect a wagering policy, is in every
case for the jury under proper instructions. The circumstance that the premiums are paid by the assignee in the
first instance, is, of course, strong evi-

dence of an intent by the parties tc
evade the law.
It should be observed that the two
cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, above referred to, viz., Cammsack v. Davis, 15 Wall. 643, and
Warnock v. Lewis, 104 U. S. 775, although proceeding on the broad principle that an assignment of the policy to
one having no insurable interest in the
life in question is invalid, are both
explicable on a different ground. In
both there were the clearest evidences of
intent to evade the prohibition of the
law against wagering policies. The
assignee of the policy was in both cases
the real principal who paid the premiums and effected the insurance.
The taking of the policy in the name
of the other party and the subsequent
assignment, were mere flimsy pretences
which did not avail to hide the substance
of the transaction.
A party may insure his life with the
money of his creditor, and afterwards
assign the policy to the creditor. Such
a transaction is not obnoxious to any
principle of law: Cunningham v. Smith's
450.
Administrator, 70 Penn. St.
Where by the terms of the policy no
assignment is permitted, an attempted
assignment is of course invalid: Stevens
v. Warren, 101 Mass. 566.
LAvRENCE
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HENRY v. KOCH.
Where the owner of an entire estate sells a portion, the purchaser takes his purchase with the burden and benefits as they appear.
A. was the owner of two houses, one built entirely upon one lot, and the other
upon the adjoining lot and upon five feet of the first lot ; a brick partition wall was
all that divided the two houses, each house serving as a support for the other. At
the same time, by separate deeds, he conveyed one lot to D. and the other lot to W.,
who conveyed them at different times to H. and K. H. owned the house that stood
five feet over on K.'s lot. K. took the roof from H.'s house to the extent it covered the strip of ground between the wall and the real division line, aut every
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other rafter supporting the roof, took up the floor of the second story of H.'s room
over the strip, and made several openings in the wall for the purpose of making
improvements to his own house, leaving H.'s house entirely exposed. Held, that
H. had an easement in so much of K.'s lot as was necessary for the support of H.'s
house.
K. could not first create a necessity for light and air on the side of his house, by
changing the arrangement of his own house, and then make that a pretext to remove so much of H.'s house as rested upon K.'s lot.
When the injury is irreparable or permanent ruin to property will ensue from
the wrongful act, a court of equity will interfere by injunction to prevent the injury.
And if necessary the court may, after the commencement of the injury, compel
by mandatory injunction, the restoration of the property to its original condition.

from a decree refusing an injunction. The facts are
fully stated in the opinion which was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-George Anderson being the owner in fee of a lot of
ground, in the city of Louisville, upon which he had erected certain buildings, severed the lot and buildings upon it by conveyances
made at the same time, to one Doup and Wright. There were two
rooms, or rather two houses, on the lot, divided by a partition wall,
at the time of the conveyance, Doup acquiring by his purchase
one of the rooms, and Wright the othel. They purchased, as
stated, of Anderson, who was the sole owner in the year 1871.
The lots fronted on Washington street, between Floyd and Preston
streets. The appellant, Mr. Henry, purchased the lot sold Doup,
and the appellee the lot sold Wright. The conveyance from Anderson to Doup describes the lot as running 183 feet east of Floyd
street, and thence with Main street eastwardly twenty-six and threetwelfths feet, thence westwardly 204 feet to Washington street, &c.,
to have and to hold the same with all the appurtenances thereon to
the second party and his heirs for ever.
The agreed facts show conveyances were made by Doup and
Wright to these parties, and that they entered into possession. It
also appears that the boundary dividing the two lots or houses is a
straight line, and that the wall separating the two buildings is all
on the lot owned by the appellee, having a strip of at least five feet
of appellee's lot beyond the wall and adjacent to appellant's lot.
Appellant's house is a two-story metal roofed brick building, but,
according to the proof, of but little value. The appellee desired to
remodel his building and to convert it into a residence or rooms
suitable for that purpose; and as the wall stood entirely upon his
lot, with a space of five feet of ground in addition, belonging to
him, lying between the wall and the lot of the appellant, he began
APPEAL
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the improvement. The appellant's house had for its support this
partition wall with the roof, rafters and joists all resting upon it;
and was so constructed by Anderson, at the time he sold to Doup
and Wright, the vendors of these parties. No change had been
made in the building affecting the rights of the parties in any manner, until shortly before the institution of this action in March 1880,
when the appellee took the roof from appellant's house, to the extent that it covered the strip of ground between the wall and the
real division line, cut loose every other rafter supporting the roof,
took up the floor of the second story of appellant's room over the
strip, and proceeded to make various openings in the wall, for the
purpose of making his improvements, leaving the inside of appellant's house entirely exposed. Notice was given the appellant, by
a postal card, of the intention of the appellee to make the change.
The work began on the 29th of March, and this action in equity to
obtain an injunction to prevent the injury was commenced on the
12th of April. The chancellor, upon the facts stated, refused the
injunction, upon the ground that the wall was not a party wall and
no irreparable injury could result to the appellant from the conduct
of appellee, as she could build a wall on her own lot to support
the roof, and if wronged by the appellee, her remedy was at law
and not in equity.
It is not necessary to determine whether the wall dividing the
two houses is or is not, in a strict legal sense, a party wall. It is
an easement or servitude claimed by the appellant, by reason of the
grant, and the appellee had no right to deprive her of the use and
enjoyment of this right without her consent. The reason the
appellee gives for the illegal acts complained of is that he desired
to obtain light and air for the convenience of the building in its
altered condition. He first created the necessity for light and air
by remodeling his dwelling, and in order to obtain it undertook
the destruction of appellant's property. When Anderson sold and
conveyed this property to Doup, under whom appellant claims, the
wall was the support of appellant's building, and it will not be pretended that this vendor could have torn off the roof of appellant's
house that he might enjoy the benefit of the strip of ground that is
now claimed belongs to the appellee.
If he would be estopped from forcibly taking possession of appellant's property that he might enjoy his own, we cannot well see
how the grant by him to another could confer such a right.
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It was not the conveyance to Wright, under whom the appellee
claims, that gave the right; because the conveyance to Doup and
Wright created this easement. The fee simple was in Wright, and
by him passed to the appellee, but they took the title with the servitude upon it. They could see the building, its mode of construction, and the fact that the building of the appellant had its joists,
rafters and roof resting on this wall must have been known to all.
It is not a question of title or even notice, as the parties must be
presumed to have knowledge of the real boundary; but the question is was the use or continuance of the easement necessary for
the support of the structure. The parties, as said in the case of
Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505, are presumed to contract with
reference to the condition of the property at the time of the sale,
and neither has the right, by altering arrangements then openly
existing, to change materially the relative value of the respective
parts. This, the appellant or her vendor, when they purchased this
property, took, with all the benefits and burdens which appeared at
the time of the sale to belong to it. They well knew-all the parties-that the building could not stand with the wall removed, and
the right to remove it by the appellee is based on no other ground
than that he is the owner of the fee. This would apply to all servitudes, as they cannot exist without the recognition of a dominant
estate. The use of the fee cannot be made so as to destroy the
enjoyment of the easement; and the elementary books say that one
of the recognised modes of creating an easement is where the owner
of an entire estate sells a portion, the purchaser takes his purchase
with the burdens and benefits as they exist, or rather as they appear. "So if one proprietor erect two adjoining houses with a wall
between them, for the purpose of supporting both buildings, and
the same is necessary for that purpose, and he then conveys with
metes and bounds by a line running through the centre of the wall,
the grant would carry, not only what was within the limits described, but pass as an easement appurtenant to the grant a right
of support of the house by the entire wall as well that not included
as that within the limits mentioned in the deed :" Washburne on
Easements, p. 336.
In the case of -Ricardsv. Rose, an English case, found in
2 Am. Law Reg. (0. S.) 180, in discussing a question somewhat
analogous as to the rights of purchasers from a common owner, it
is said: "The right of mutual support remains, and the circum-
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stance of the title of the houses having been separated by one act,
at one time, or by different acts at different times, can make no difference in this respect."
In the case of Bobbins v. Barns, Hob. 131, and cited in the
case of Lampman v. Milks, it was held, "That when one of two
adjoining houses was originally built in such a manner that one
overhung a portion of the other, although the overhanging was
originally wrongful, yet if both houses should come afterwards to
be owned by one person, and he should sell them to different persons, without alteration, the purchaser of the overhanging house
would thereby acquire the right to maintain his house in that condition, and when it decayed to pull it down and build another of
the same description. The houses must be taken as they were at
the time of the conveyance."
The appellant has a right in common with the appellee to the use
and enjoyment of this wall for the support of his house; and it is
unreasonable to say that because the appellee owns the fee, and may
be deprived of such use of his ground as may be necessary for its
improvement, or for his own comfort, that he can tear down and
destroy appellant's building. If he can take away a part of the
flooring and roof, he may demolish the entire building by removing
the wall; hnd this, from the beginning he has made, will likely be
done, unless the chancellor interferes. It is unnecessary to inquire
whether the appellant has a remedy at law, and to determine that
because she could maintain an action of trespass or recover damages, she must look on and see her house destroyed, for that would
in effect invite the appellee to finish his undertaking. When the
injury is irreparable or permanent ruin to property will ensue from
the wrongful act, a court of equity will interfere by injunction to
prevent the injury: see Hahn & Harris v. Thornberry, 7 Bush
403; .lusselman v. Marquis, 1 Id. 463.
It is said, in the opinion below, that the injury is not irreparable,
because the appellant can build a wall of her own. The injury we
would regard as irreparable when the consequence is the destruction
of the building by reason of the act of the appellee, and that
another wall will have to be erected or house built, is not only conclusive as to the extent .of the injury being sustained, but of the
right of the appellant to ask the chancellor for relief. The enjoyment of an easement, says STORY, will be protected or secured by
a court of equity: 2 Story's Eq. Jur. (12 ed.), sect. 927, p. 110.
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It matters not, in a case like this, that the appellee, in the exercise of what he claims to be a right, has committed the wrong before
the injunction was granted, and that he may continue to injure the
building, or, if not, has placed the house of the appellant in such
a condition as to utterly ruin and destroy it, unless, as is claimed,
the appellaut should build up as the appellee tears down. Here the
owner of the estate, upon which the burden rests, undertakes to
remove it, and does remove that which is indispensable to the building itself. If left exposed to the weather or barely supported by
the remaining joists, complete ruin will be the result. What relief
should the chancellor give in a case like this ? It seems to us a
judgment should be rendered requiring the appellee to repair the
injury by placing the building in the condition it was prior to his
wrongful act, and paying such damages as the appellant has stistained, by being deprived of the use of her building.. To do otherwise would be to give the appellee a right by reason of his wrong.
He ought not to be allowed to say that because he has destroyed
the easement therefore the damages sustained is the only relief the
appellant is entitled to.
In the case of Morrison v. llarquardt,24 Iowa 35; s. c. 7 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 306, the owner of the estate owing servitude was
made to restore it, or the party injured allowed to repair or build,
at the expense of the party committing the wrong. So in this case
the party should be made to restore the wall and repair the building, or the appellant should be permitted to do so at his expense.
In this case the servitude was not only apparent when the lots
were sold, but it was plain to all that the building of the appellant
could not stand without it; and we see nothing in the proof authorizing the conclusion that the act of the appellee was by the
consent of the appellant, and the relief should have been granted
in the manner designated.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In Ray v. Sweeney, 14 Bush 1, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky had denied
the English doctrine of implied grant of
an easement of air and light in an
adjoining lot. But in the principal
case the court announces the well-

tion of the two lots and houses
described. A recent English author
says: "A right to support for buildings, both from the subjacent and adjacent soil, and from adjoining buildings,
may be acquired by grant, express or

reeognised doctrine with respect to
the sale of property in the condi-

implied. This right arises by implied
grant, in the absence of express stipula
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tion, in every case where an owner of
adjoining houses, or of house and land,
severs the property by sale, for in every
such case rights to support are granted
by implication, by the vendor and purchaser respectively, for the preservation
of the buildings belonging to each
other:" Goddard's Law of Easement
(Am. ed.) 228. In the case of adjoining houses, the proposition stated is
supported by both the English and
American cases.
In the case of Richards v. Rose, cited
in the opinion, 2- Am. L. Reg. (0. S.)
178; 9 Exch. 218; POLLOCK, C. B.,
said: "When a number of houses are
built together on a spot of ground, in
such a manner as to require the mutual
support of each other for the purpose of
their common protection and security,
and the owner afterwards parts with the
possession, either one at a time or both
together, and the property is Afterwards
subdivided by mortgage, or demised in
any other way, it seems necessary, as matter of common sense, that that right of
mutual support remain; and the circumstance of the title of the houses having
been separated by one act at one time,
or by different acts at different times,
can make no difference in this respect.
It would be a violation of common sense
to hold that any man, who by any
means comes into the possession of one
of a number of such houses, might say
to the occupier of the neighboring ones,
' You are not entitled to the protection
and support of my house ; I will pull it
down, and allow yours to collapse and
fall into the ruins.' It is impossible not
to come to the conclusion that the law on
this subject must be in accordance with
the common sense of it; and there is a
case where something similar was held
with respect to another sort of easement,
yiz., a right of way. In all such cases
the right of mutual dependence and support rests'either on a presumed grant
from one of the parties, or a presumed

reservation of the right by the seller of
the property."
In a subsequent case it was announced that "where two properties are
possessed by the same owner, and there
has been a severance made of part from
the other, anything which vas used, and
was necessary for the comfortable enjoyment of that part of the property
which was granted, must be considered
to follow from the grant." This was
spoken with reference to a drain extending from one lot to another : Ewart v.
Cochrane, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 925. Pyer v.
Carter, 1 Hurlst. & N. 916, is a like
S
case.
In New York a case arose where the
owner of adjoining houses, having a
common party wall, conveyed the houses
to different grantees, and made the
centre of the wall the dividing line of
the land conveyed to them respectively;
each grantee acquired, it was held, an
easement of supporting his building by
means of the half of the wall belonging
to his neighbor. The right was held to
exist so long as the wall continued to be
sufficient for the purpose, and the respective buildings remained in a condition to need and enjoy its support.
When one of the buildings thus supported becomes dilapidated or unsafe and unfit for occupation, and the
removal of the front and rear walls of
such building, with the floors and beams,
would occasion the destruction of the
whole wall, the owner of such building
may, upon reasonable notice to the tenant of the adjoining building, lawfully
take down the whole wall; and if he
occupy no unnecessary time in completing the work, and use proper care
and skill in its execution, he is not responsible to the tenant of the adjoining
building for damage resulting from its
exposure to the weather, from loss of
business or inability to let the upper lofts.
It was said it seemed that the easement
of such proprietor in the tenement of the
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other ceases with the existence of the
state of things which had created it, and
that there is no right in either, in case
the other refuse to co-operate, to rebuild
the wall and claim contribution: Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601, affirming
the same case, as reported in 3 Duer
184. The chief difference in the facts
of this case, and the principal one is,
that in the latter the wall was not in a
decaying condition and not in need of
repairs, while in the New York case it
was, and it was held that it could be
repaired, even though it subjected the
complaining party to an injury: citing
Campbell v. Mlesiier, 4 Johns. Oh. 334,
and Sherred v. Cisco, 4 Sandf. (N. Y)
S. C. 480. If the wall become unfit for
use it is sai~i it may be removed : Reynolds v. Fargo, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 531;
Crawshaw v. Sumner, 56 Mo. 517.
A block of buildings was erected in
Boston in 1808, consisting of a central
building and two wings, with a piazza
in front of the central building, and side
doors in the wings opening on and
swinging over the piazza, the upper
parts of which were used as windows.
The wings were conveyed in 1811 to
different parties, without mentioning the
side doors, and in 1816 the central
buildings were sold to the United States.
It was held that the use of these side
doors and windows passed as appurtenances, without any reference to the
length of time during which they had
been used. Consequently their use
could not be interfered with: United
States v. Appleton, 1 Sumner 492.
So in Pennsylvania, where an ovner
of land subject to a mortgage laid it out
in lots, and bailt on two adjoining lots;
on one was an alley which was used by
the other, and the land was sold in distinct lots under the mortgage decree of
foreclosure, the use of the alley being
apparent; it was held that the first lot
was sold subject to the use of the alley,
although no reference to it was made in
the sheriff's deed. The law of the case
VoL. XXXI.-51

was formulated as follows : " Where a
continuous and apparent servitude is
imposed by an owner on one part of his
land for the benefit of another, a purchaser at private or judicial sale takes it
subject to the servitude :" Cannon v.
Boyd, 73 Penn. St. 179.
The owner of a fifty-foot lot divided
the same into two equal parts by an east
and west line, and built a house on the
north part, and placed the south wall
thereof so that half of it stood on each
lot; and also made an eight-inch projection on the south side of the wall
resting on the south lot, containing a
flue which was specially adapted and
used for carrying off smoke from a furnace permanently built in the house.
The owner conveyed the north half of
the fifty-foot lot to the centre of the
south wall, with the house, to the complainant, and subsequently sold the
south half of the fifty-foot lot to the
defendant. It was held that the casement being obvious and apparent to any
observer, the purchaser of the south lot
was chargeable with notice, and would
be enjoined from interfering with the
flue: Ingals v. Plamondon, 75 Ill. 118;
s. c. 15 Am. L. Reg. 220. A case
similar to the principal one was: Rogers
v. Sinsheimer, 50 N. Y. 646 ; also E-no
v. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer 53; s. c. 6 Id.
17 ; Webster v. Steven, 5 Id. 553.
But a distinction must be observed in
the case. Thus the owner can have no
easement in or over his adjoining lands:
and when he sells one parcel, the right
to enjoy privileges and conveniences
which he, when owner of both, enjoyed
in the other, does not pass to the purchasers: Stanford v.' Lyon, 22 N. J.
Eq. 33; Fetters v. Hiumphreys, 19 Id.
471 ; Thompson v. W4aterlow, L. R., 6
Eq. 36; Langley v. Hammond, L.
R., 3 Exch. 161. If the owner sells
the adjoining lot without a reservation
of any rights in the same, he loses all
such rights: Denton v. Leddell, 23 N. J.
Eq. 64; Tenant v. Goldian, 2 7,d.
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Raym. 1093; Dodd v. Btrchell. 1 Hurl.
& C. 113.
A cc NT WINDOWS.-There is a line
of interesting cases on the subject of
ancient lights, depending upon the principle announced in this case. Thus
one Sexton owned two lots, adjoining
each other, and in 1797 built a house
upon one with windows looking out
upon his adjoining lot. The house was
built on the line dividing the two lots.
His heirs in 1829 sold the lot with the
house on it to one Smith, who afterwards sold the same to Robeson and
Maxwell. The heirs of Sexton sold the
other lot in 1831 to one Iatthews; and
he conveyed it to Pittenger. In 1838
Pittenger attempted to build a house on
his lot so as to shut up the windows of
the house on the adjoining lot. The
court enjoined the erection of the building, upon the ground that the owner of
the old house had an easement in the
light which flowed across Pittenger's lot
of which he could not be deprived ; and
while the court recognised the wellknown English law of ancient lights
with regard to the adverse user, yet it
placed its decision upon the circumstauce of the purchase from the joint
owner of the two lots, and the fact that
each successive owner of the adjoining
lot took it with notice of the plaintiff's
rights : Robeson v. Pittenger, 1 Green
(N. J.) Eq. 57. It is to be observed
that the court afterwards decided, that
where one builds a house on the boundary line of his lot, he cannot acquire a
right to light by adverse user, and the
adjoifiing owner cannot be prevented
from obstructing the windows of the
former: King v. Miller, 4 Halst. 559.
It is very doubtful if the courts of New
Jersey would follow Robeson v. Pittenget, supra, at this date upon the same
state of facts. See Hayden v. Dutcher,
31 N. J. Eq. 217.
So in England, at an early day, it was
said: " If I have a house with certain

lights in it, and lands adjoining, and I
sell the house but keep the land adjoining,
neither I, nor any one claiming under
me, can obstruct the lights by building
on the land I retained, for, by selling
the house I sell an easement in the lights
also :" Palmer v. Fletcher. 1 Lev. 122
(1675) ; see Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. I
Lamrpman v. .Mfilks, 21 N. Y. 505;
Nichols v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121
This
Robbins Y. Barnes, Hob. 131.
doctrine was well illustrated in Havens,
v. Klein, 51 How. Pr. 82, where window shutters swung out over an adjoining lot owned by the proprietor of the
house, which house he afterwards sold.
A like case is Story v. Odin, 12 Mass.
157; and the principle announced in
Robeson v. Pittenger, supra, has been
recognised in a number of authorities.
See Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass. 443;
Thayer v. Payne, 2 Cush. 327; Cox v.
M1,atthews, Vent. 237 ; Riviere v. Bower,
Ry. & Mo. 24; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4
Paige (Ch.) 169 ; Sw'ansborough v. Cotentry, 9 Bing. 305. See Tenant v.
Goodwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1093; White v.
Bass, 7 Hurl. & Nor. 722 ; Hubbard v.
Town, 33 Vt. 295. Rosewell v. Pryor,
in different phases, was three times before the court: 6 Mod. 116; s. a. 12
Id. 215, 635. Lord HoLT, said: "If
a man have a vacant piece of ground,
and builds thereupon, and that house
has very good lights, and he lets this
house to another, and afterwards builds
upon a contiguous piece of ground, or
lets the contiguous piece of ground to
another, who builds thereupon, to the
nuisance of the lights in the first house,
the lessee of the first house shall have an
action upon the case against such builders, for the first house was granted to
him with all the easements and deSee
lights then belonging to it."
Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407. So, in Maryland, the English doctrine
as to light is upheld where the owner of
two adjoining lots conveyed one of them:
Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1 ; s. c. 11
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Am. L. Reg. 24. The English doctrine
of presumptive title to light and air received over land of another person,
arising from uninterrupted user for
twenty years and upwards, has been
acknowledged and declared to be the
law in Delaware in all its breadth:
Clawson v. Pdmrose, 15 Am. L. fReg.
6. The note appended in the Register
contains a citation of all the English and
American cases upon this subject.
Those who desire to pursue the subject further, will find in the following
citations the doctrine of the principal
case applied to right of light and air:
Allen v. Taylor, 16 Ch. Div. 355 ; 50
L. J. Ch. 178-L R. ; Barnes v.
Loac,, L. R., 4 Q. B. Div. 494; 48 ,.
J. Q. B. 756 ; Warner v. MloBryde, 36
L. T. (N. 8.) 360.
But the doctrine of implied grant with
respect to light and air coming across
the adjacent property of the vendor, has
been denied by a number of courts:
Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537 ; Turner v. Thompson, 58 Geo. 269 ; Palmer
v. Wemore, 2 Sandf. Sup. Ct. 316;
Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 ; s.
o. 7 Am. L. Reg. 336; Keats v. Hugo,
115 Mass. 204.
The cases of Mullen v. Stricker, 19
Ohio St. 135; Maynard v. .Esher, 17
Penn. St. 222; Collier v. Pierce, 7
Gray 18, and Randall v. Sanderson, 111
lMass. 114, adopt the same view. But
it is necessary to note that in these four
cases both the adjoining lots in each case
were sold at the same instant--generally
at auction-and that the sale at the
same time of both lots, had much
weight given it by the courts in deciding
the rights of the parties.
Other cases hold that an implied grant
of an easement in light will be sustained
only in cases of real necessity; and will
be denied or rejected in cases where it
appears that the owners claiming the
easement can, at a reasonable cost, have
or substitute other lights to his building:
Turner v. Thompson, 58 Geo. 268;

Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1; s. 0. 13
Am. Rep. 629. And in a recent English case this view was adopted. A
vendor having conveyed a pl6t of landpart of his property-to A., without any
reservation, and subsequently another
plot, part of the property retained and
adjoining the first plot to B., upon B.
claiming in right of his plot, a right of
light over A.'s plot, which, in the opinion of the court, was not an easement of
necessity, it was held that, though the
easement claimed might be continuous
and apparent, yet, not being of necessity,
there was no implied reservation of it by
the vendor out of his conveyance to A.,
and B. was, therefore, not entitled to
it: Wheeldon v. Burrows, 18 Am. L.
Reg. 646; s. c. 12 Ch. Div. 31; 48
L. J. Oh. 853; 41 L.T. 327; 28W.
Rep. 196. The same reasoning was*
applied to a drain in Randall v. MeLouqlin, 10 Allen 366; Dolljif v.
Boston and Maine Railroad Co., 68 Me.
173.
MUANDATOIY INJUNCTIONS.-Another
important part of the decision in the
principal case is the granting of a mandatory injunction to restore the property
to its original condition.
"While the
jurisdiction of equity by way of mandatory injunction is rarely exercised, and
while its existence has even been questioned, it is nevertheless too firmly established to admit of doubt:" High on
Injunction (2d ed.), sect. 2. It has been
defined as follows: "A mandatory injunction is such as, being framed in an
indirect form, compels the defendant to
restore things to their former condition,
and virtually directs the defendant to
perform an act:"
Joyce on Injunction 1310.
The grounds for equitable interposition by mandatory injunction are twofold: First, the inadequacy of any legal
remedy to secure the party in the enjoyment of his rights ; and second, to prevent a multiplicity of suits; as to con-
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pel the restoration of running water to
its natural channel, when wrongfully
diverted therefrom, at the suit of the
party whose lands include either the
whole or a part of such channel: Corning v. Troy Iron and .Iail Factory, 40
N. Y. 191 ; s. a. 34 Barb. 485 ; 39 Id.
311 ; Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 193 ;
Longwood Valley RailroadCo. v. Baker,
12 C. E. Green (N. J.) Eq. 166.
The rule is that an interlocutory order
need not be applied for where the injunction sought is mandatory: Gale v.
Abbot, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 987.
Yet mandatory injunctions are allowed on interlocutory application; and
the practice is followed where great and
irreparable injury would result before
final hearing: Robinson v. Byron, 1
Bro. C. C. 588. As to compel the removal of tiles placed on the tops of chimneys which can be taken off: Hervey v.
Smith, 1 Kay & J. 392. Or to pull
down a building that was clearly a nuisance: 3 Dan. Chan. Prac. 1767 ; by
restraining the owner from permitting it
to remain: Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Sim.
13. So on final hearing: North of England Railtbay Co. v. Clarence Railway
Co., 1 Coll. 507.
And on final hearing the defendant in
another case was compelled to remove a
plate put over the fine of a chimney so
as to fill the house with smoke: The Attorney-General v. Ietropolitan Board, I
Hem. & Mil. 321. And to compel the
removal of combustible jute which endangered the plaintiff's premises: R1epburn v. Lardner, 2 Hem. & JAlil. 345. So
an injunction was ordered to restrain permitting the communication complained of
(by which complainant's mine was
flooded), to remain bpen. The injunction was to prevent the flowing of a mine
by restraining or removing the means by
which the defendant continued to do it :
Mexborough v. Bower, 7 Beav. 127. So
an injunction against preventing the plaintiffs from having access to the books of
the firm, and keeping them at any other

place than the place of business of the
partnership: Greatrex v. Greatrex, 1
De Gex & Sm. 692; or excluding him
from exercising his right as a partner:
Marble Conpany v. Ripley, 10 Wall.
339.
So, where a court of equity decreed a
conveyance from the defendant to the
complainant, and the defendant refused
to deliver up the premises and execute
a deed therefor, a writ of injunction to
compel a delivery of the possession was
issued: Garretson v. Cole, 1 Har. & J.
370.
So, to quiet title as against an outstanding deed, and cause it to be delivered up. But a decree commanding
the delivery of the deed will not be
granted where the deed appears void on
its face: Peirsoll v. Elliott, 6 Pet. 95.
So, to restrain the defendant from permitting an obstruction to remain on the
plaintiff's roof: Martyr v. Lawrence, 2
De Gex J. & S. 261. So, to restrain
the defendant from permitting a building erected by him to remain in the
plaintiff's right of way: Krehl v. Burrell, 7 Ch. Div. 551.
So, to compel the closing of a ditch
unlawfully opened, by which the plaintiff's lands were being flooded: Foot v.
Bronson, 4 Lansing 47.
So, to command not thereafter to continue to cause to flow irregularly a
stream by which the plaintiff's mill had
been supplied, and the current of which
had been impeded by breaches made by
the defendant: Murdock's (aset Bland.
(Mfd.) Ch. 471 ; s. c. 20 Am. Cas. 381),
and note.
So, where the defendant had covenanted with his vendor to erect a pump
and reservoir at a well or spring, which
covenant ran with the fee, it was held,
though it was not one of which the
court would decree specific performance
directly, as being for the construction of
works which the court could not superintend, yet it could be enforced indirectly by an injunction restraining the
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defendant from allowing the work to
remain unperformed : Cooke v. Chilcott,
3 Ch. Div. 694.
So, where the defendant had agreed to
make a road, a mandatory injunction
issued to prevent him from allowing the
work to remain unperformed : Storer v.
Great Western Railway Co., 2 Younge &
Coll. Ch. 48.
But one was refused to compel a landlord to repair the demised premises
where he had covenanted to do so : Jarvis
v. Henwood, 10 C. E. Green (N. J.)
460.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co.,
13 How. 518, was a petition for an
injunction to prevent the company from
obstructing the navigation of the Ohio
The bridge was
river by its bridge.
nearly completed, and was as much an
obstruction as it would be when completed. The court issued an order compelling the company to change its bridge
according to certain given specifications,
and that it do it by a certain date.
A statute provided that an injunction
might be granted against the malicious
erection upon one's own land of any
structure intended to annoy or injure
any proprietor of adjacent land, in respect to his use of the same. Where a
structure was thus stealthily erected, and
was completed before an application for
an injunction could be made, the court
granted an injunction against its continuance: Harbison v. White, 46 Conn.
106. So, where a building was erected
in violation of a contract with complainant and defendant's original grantor of both their lots, to the effect that
no wooden buildings should be erected
on either of their two lots, and the defendant succeeded in getting up a
wooden building before a restraining
order could be obtained: Gaslin v.
Balls, 13 Ch. Div. 324 ; Rankin v. Busisson, 4 Sim. 13.
And where an action was brought in
the name of a church corporation, al.
leging that the defendants had taken

possession of its church building, and
part of its official records, and were
threatening to seize the remainder of the
records and all its temporalities, it was
held that by an injunction restraining the
defendants from further interfering with
the property and temporalities of the
corporation, the plaintiff, by its trustees,
officers and members, could be restored
to the peaceful possession of its rights,
without any further order of court,
except a special order requiring the
defendants to restore that portion of the
records of the corporation which they
had taken: Lutheran Ev. Church v.
Gristgau, 34 Wis. 328. See Baptist
Congregation v. Scannel, 3 Grant (Pa.)
48.
Where the defendants, by means of a
tunnel run into a mountain at a lower
altitude than complainant's tunnel,
wrongfully intercepted water" appropriated by complainant, flowing in its
said tunnel, and diverted it therefrom, a
preliminary injunction was granted, restraining the continuance of said diversion, although obedience to the injunction rendered it necessary for the
defendants to build a bulkhead or dam
across the tunnel: C. S. M. Co. v. V.
6- G. H. TV. Co., 1 Sawyer 470; s. c.
Id. 685.

A mandatory injunction will be issued
where the flow of water, necessary to
run a large factory, has been cut off;
especially so where the amount of loss
of profits would be difficult or impossible
to estimate: Isenberg v. East India
House Estate, 33 L. J. Eq. 392.
So, health officers may be restrained by
a mandatory injunction from allowing a
sewer to remain open : 11anchester Railroad Co. v. Worksop Board bf Bealth,
23 Beav. 209 ; Pierce v. New Orleans,
18 La. Ann. 242.
The manager of a business has been
enjoined from excluding the owner of
the business.from the premises : Eachus
v. Moss, 14 W. R. 327.
Where the lessee of a mine had
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worked into the complainant's premises,
and extracted a large amount of ore
therefrom, a mandatory injunction was
granted requiring defendant to permit
the complainant to inspect the mine for
the purpose of determining the extent
of the injury: Thomas Iron Co. v. Allentown Alining Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 77.
In case of the obstruction of ancient
lights a mandatory injunction has been
allowed to restore them to their previous condition: Kfelk v. Pearson, L.
R., 6 Ch. 809. Even before final hearing: Bladel v. Rengy, L. R., 3 Eq. 465.
But delay may waive the right to this
extraordinary remedy: Senior v. Pawson, L. R., 3 Eq. 330.
Where the defendant had entered into
a covenant restraining the erection of
buildings upon the premises conveyed
to him, a mandatory injunction was
issued to compel their removal when
erected in violation of such covenant,
and where the grantor had suffered
actual damage: Lord Manners v. Johnson, I Oh. Div. 673; Schwoerer v. Boylston, 99 Alass. 285.
So, where a husband wrongfully seized
possession of his wife's separate estate
and excluded her, a mandatory injunction was issued to restore the possession
to her: Green v. Green, 5 Hare 400 n.
No doubt if a public highway was
closed up a mandatory injunction would
issue to compel its opening : Stevens v.
Paterson and Newark Railroad Co., 20
N. J. Eq. 126; McDonogh v. Calloway, 7 Robinson 442; Newmorch v.
Brondling, 3 Swanston 99.
In Pennsylvania a mandatory injunction lies at the suit 'of the attorneygeneral, to compel the Lehigh Coal and
Navigatioii Company to restrain the
company from neglecting to repair its
canal, dams, locks and other devices for
navigation : Buck. Mountain Coal Co. v.
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 50
Penn. St. 91.
Where a railway company had agreed
with a man to make a road at a certain

level, they were restrained from making
a road at a lower level than they
had agreed to do: Foster v. Birninghan, 6-c., Railway Co., 2 W. R. 378.
A court may compel the alteration of
the elevation or form of a building so as
to be in conformity with the terms of a
contract or an act of the legislature:
Warden of Dover Harbor v. Southeastern Railway Co., 9 Hare 493;
Franklyn v. Tuton, 5 Madd. 46.
In Webb v. Portland 3anufacturing
Co., 3 Sumn. 189, a mandatory injunction was issued to prevent tile diversion
of a stream to the injury of the plaintiff's
mill, where the defendant had already
done the act which caused the diversion.
In Goodson v. Richardson, L. R., 9
Ch. Ap. 221, an injunction was granted
against permitting water pipes to remain which the defendant had laid in
the plaintiff's soil.
Where a plaintiff has proven his right
to an injunction against a nuitance or
other injury, it is no part of the duty of
the court to inquire in what way the
defendant can best remove it. The
plaintiff is entitled to an injunction at
once, unless the removal of the injury is
"physically impossible ; and it is the duty
of the defendant to find his own way out
of the difficulty, whatever inconvenience
or expense it may put him to: AttorneyGeneral v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum,
L. H., 4 Ch. Ap. 146.
An injunction was refused to compel
a common carrier to transport goods at
the rates fixed by law: Rogers Locomotive and Machine Works v. Erie Railway
Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 379.
So, a mandatory injunction was refused where it was sought by dealers
and shippers of coal to compel a railroad
company to allow or continue to the
plaintiffs such use of wharves and wharfing privileges for shipping coal as were
required for their business: Audenried v.
Philadelphiaand Reading Railroad Co.,
68 Penn. St. 370. Such an injunction
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will not be allowed to compel the re- The jurisdiction has been questioned,
building of a wall which had been over- but its existence must be admitted as
thrown, the remedy being ample at law:
beyond all doubt. It must, however,
Doran v. Carroll, 11 Ir. Ch. 379. So be exercised with caution, and is strictly
where the title to the locus in quo is in confined to cases where the remedy at
dispute, one will not be issued to put the law is inadequate for the purpose of
complainant in possession: Gaunt v. justice, and the restoring of things to
Fynney, L. R., 8 Ch. 8.
their former condition is the only remedy
In Lexhkqton City National Bank v. which will meet the requirements of the
Gnysn, 6 Bush 486, a mandatory in- case. If there is a full and complete
junction was refused on ie ground that remedy at law, or if the injury done can
the wrong done, if any, was complete, be sufficiently estimated and properly
and that the remedy was at law. It compensated by a pecuniary sum, there
was sought to compel the removal of a is no case for a mandatory injunction.
building erected across a certain passage- The court will not interfere by way of
way. But the court in fact refused the mandatory injunction without taking
injunction because it was of the opinion into consideration the comparative conthat there was no obstruction of the ease- venience and inconvenience which the
ment upon which the building was al- granting or withholding the injunction
leged to have been built.
would cause to the parties. If the inIn Risher v. Board of Trade, 80 Il. jury done is capable of being fully and
85, a mandatory injunction to compel abundantly compensated by a pecuniary
the restoration of the plaintiff to member- sum, while the inconvenience to the
ship in an association from which lie had other party from granting an injunction
been unlawfully expelled was refused.
would be serious, the court will not interSo, where a party entered by force fere by way of mandatory injunction,
upon the premises of another, in his ab- but will either direct an inquiry before
sence, a mandatory injunction to compel itself in order to ascertain the measure
him to yield up possession to the rightful of damages that has been actually susowner, was refused, upon the ground tained, or will, on dismissing the bill,
that the damage was already done:
reserve to the plaintiff his right to proWangelin v. Goe, 50 Ill. 459.
ceed at law. If on the other hand the
So, where the damages resulting from injury is of so serious or material a
the stoppagq of ancient lights was small, character that the restoring things to
a mandatory injunction to open them their former condition is the only remedy
was refused: Webster v. Wiewall, 42 which will meet the requirements of the
L. T. 868.
case, or if the act complained of is in
One of the leading authorities upon breach of an express stipulation, the ininjunction says: "Though a court of junction will issue, notwithstanding the
equity has no jurisdiction to compel the amount of inconvenience to the other
performance of a positive act tending to party., If the act complained of is conalter the existing state of things, such as tinued or carried on after clear and disthe removal of a work already executed, tinct notice that it is objected to, the
it may, by framing the order in an indi- jurisdiction will be exercised more
rect form, compel a defendant to restore freely than in cases where the complaint
things to their former condition, and so is not made until after it is completed ;
effectuate the same results as would be but the mere fact that the act complained
obtained by ordering a positive act to be of has been continued or carried on after
done. The order when framed in such notice of objection, is not of itself a
a~orm is called a mandatory injunction. sufficient ground for the exercise of the
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jurisdiction, if the injury done can be
amply, abundantly and properly compensated by a pecuniary sum. There is
no rule which prevents the court from
granting a mandatory injunction where
the injury sought to be restrained has
been completed before the filing of the
bill. A man who comes to the court for
a mandatory injunction should use due
diligence in making the application.
Mere delay will not be fatal to the application if no mischiefis caused thereby
to the defendant, and the delay does not
exceed a reasonable period; but the
right to a mandatory injunction is gone
if there has been unreasonable delay,
and mischief would be caused thereby to
the defendant. A bill for a mandatory
injunction should pray for a preventive
remedy. There can be no case for pre'vention where what is asked to be prevented has been actually done :" Kerr
on Injunction, pp. 230, 231, 232.
It is undoubtedly the case, as the list
of authorities cited in this note shows,
that mandatory injunctions are more
freely and frequently granted in England than in the United States. Bu
the writ is not always denied in this
The citation of authorities
country.
abundantly demonstrates the power of
courts of equity, or those with equity jurisdiction, to issue such writs whenever
there is an equity in favor of it. It will
be observed that the writ was issued in
those cases where a continuance of the
injury complained of would work a
further injury. Where the injury was
already done, and no further injury
could be done, there the writ is very
properly denied, because its issuance is
not necessary for the preservation of the
A
complainant's rights or property.
A
few examples will illustrate this.
court of equity will always intervene
with its strong arm in case of a threatened danger, and it has the power to
prevent it by restraining the parties
putting, or threatening to put, it in
motion. Suppose a company was sup-

plying a city with water by pipes laid
under its streets, and the city was dependent upon such supply of water to
put out fires. If the supply was unlawfully cut off, a court of equity would
have full power to issue a writ of injunction to compel the company to cease
preventing the water from flowing, even
though it required the keeping up of
fires under boilers for that purpose. In
such a case a mandatory injunction
would undoubtedly issue at once, without waiting for a final decree; especially
so if it occurred at a very dry time, when
fires would be likely to do great damage.
So, where a gas company wantonly cut
off the supply of gas from a large city in
violation of a contract, leaving the city
in darkness.
Or where a public and
much used thoroughfare, in a populous
county or city, is obstructed, or a watercourse whereon boats run, a mandatory
injunction would issue at once to restore
it to its former condition, and not wait
until the final decree, or until the defendant was indicted and convicted of
obstructing a public highway. An instructive case upon granting a temporary
mandatory injunction, is that of The Cole
Silver M11ining Co. v. The Virginia and
Gold Hill Water Co., 1 Sawyer 470.
This case has already been cited in this
note. The first opinion was delivered
by Judge SwYER. He granted a preMr.
liminary mandatory injunction.
Justice FsELn concurred in the action
ofJudge SAwYER upon final hearing (Id.
685), saying: "The owner of flumes, acqueducts or reservoirs of water might,
for instance, flood his neighbor's fields
by raising the sluice gates to these
structnres, and, if the flowing should
not be speedily stayed, might destroy
the latter's crops ; and yet, according to
the argument of the learned counsel, no
injunction could issue to restrain the
owner from continuing the flood, if obedience should require him to do the simple
affirmative act of closing his gates. The
person whose fields were inundated and
4t6
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whose crops were destroyed, in the case
supposed, would find poor satisfaction in
being told that he must wait until final
decree before any process could issue to
compel the shutting of the gates, and hie
must seek compensation for the injuries
his property may suffer in the meantime,
in an action at law."
Again: "Other cases to the same
purport might be cited, but these are
sufficient, I think, to show that a court
of equity has jurisdiction to issue, upon
an interlocutory application, an injunction which will operate to compel the
defendant, in order to obey it, to do substantive acts. It is a jurisdiction which
should only be exercised in a case where
irreparable injury would follow from a
:eglcct to do the act required.
Some
of the adjudged cases evince a disposition on the part of the court to restrict
rather than enlarge this jurisdiction:
( 3lakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal
Co., I Myl. & K. 154). Undoubtedly,
the general purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the property in
controversy from waste or destruction or
disturbance, until the rights and equities
of the contesting ptrties can be fully
considered and determined.
Usually
this can be effected by restraining any
interference with it ; but in some cases
the continuance of the injury, the corn-

mencement of which has induced the
invocation of the authority of a court of
equity, would lead to the waste and destruction of the property. It is just
here where the special jurisdiction of the
court is needed to restore the property
to that condition in which it existed immediately preceding the commencement
of the injury, so that it may be preserved
until final decree :" Id., p. 693. See
also the restraining orders granted in
Southern Express Co. v. Nashville, C. .
St. L. Railway, 20 Am. Law. Reg. N.
S. 590, and cases cited in note.,
On tie contrary, in the case of Audentied v. Pdladelphia, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
68 Penn. St. 370, and Rogers Locomzotive and fflachne Works v. Erie Railway
Co., 5 C. E. Green (N. J.) 387, strong
grounds were taken against the granting
of mandatory injunctions upon preliminary hearing, and the power of courts in
such cases practically denied.
Those instances in which a mandatory
injunction has been granted, in many
cases upon final bearing, resemble very
closely the enforcement of the decree of
a court of equity by a writ of execution
or the like. Where such a writ is issued
to compel performance of a contract or
covenant, it very closely resembles a
decree for specific performance.
W. W. TuontTOW.
Indianapolis.

United States Circuit Court, District of Oregon.
SPARE v. HOME MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
A contract for insurance against loss by fire is a contract of indemnity ; and a
contraeftto that end with a person who has no insurable interest in the property, or who
cannot sustain any pecuniary loss by injury thereto, is a mere wager, contrary to
public policy and void.
Any person who has a legal or equitable interest in property, or is so related
to it that an injury to it may cause him pecuniary loss, has an insurable interest
therein.
A judgment creditor has an insurable interest in the properly of his debtor; but
VOL. XXXI.-52
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he cannot recover from the insurer upon an injury thereto as for a loss to himself,
unless he also shows that the judgment debtor has not sufficient property left, out
of which the judgment can be satisfied.
While the insurer may be estopped to insist on conditions and restrictions contained in a policy issued with a knowledge of facts inconsistent therewith, neither
party to a contract of insurance which is void as being contrary to public policy, is
estopped to deny its legality.

THE plaintiff, a citizen of Oregon, brought this action against
the defendant, a corporation formed under the laws of California
and doing business in Oregon, to recover the sum of $900, with
interest since March 1st 1882, on a policy of insurance for that
amount, against loss by fire.
The case was heard upon a demurrer to the complaint. The
question argued was, had the plaintiff an insurable interest in the
property destroyed? The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
W. Scott Beebe, for the plaintiff.
Cyrus Dolph, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DEAfY, J.-From the amended complaint it appears that on
July 26th 1881, Aaron and Ben Lurch were partners under the
name of "Lurch Brothers," and -as such, owned a lot in Cottage
Grove, Lane county, Oregon, of the value of $100, together with
a warehouse thereon of the value of $1300; that on December 1st
1878, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against said firm, in the
Circuit Court of the state for said county, for the sum of $4500,
which judgment was duly docketed before said July 26th, and
thereafter was a lien thereon ; that on said last-mentioned date
the defendant, in consideration of the premium of $18.90, paid to
it by plaintiff, insured him against loss or damage by fire to said
warehouse, for one year, in the sum of $900, and that on February 14th 1882, said warehouse was totally destroyed by fire,
whereby the plaintiff was damaged $1300.
The complaint also states that on March 1st 1882, the proof of
loss was furnished and the same adjusted at $900, and that the
defendant at all the times mentioned well knew that the property
was owned by "Lurch Brothers," and the nature of, the plaintiff's
interest therein.
A contract for insurance against fire with a person not having
an insurable interest in the property, or subject of the insurance,
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is a mere wager, and considered void on grounds of public policy.
For where the only interest that th6 assured has in the property is
its destruction by fire, the transaction is a direct incentive to fraud
and arson.
A lawful contract of insurance against fire is, therefore, a contract of indemnity--an engagement to make good to the assured a
pecuniary loss sustained by him on account of injury to the property in question. Therefore it is said that the assured must have
an interest in the property injured, for otherwise he can suffer n6
loss thereby: Woods Fire Ins., sect. 248; Bohrbach v. Germania
-Fire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 52; Grevemeyer v. Southern Hut.
Fire Ins. Co., 62 Penn. St. 340; iHicDonaldv. Admr. of Black,
20 Ohio 191 ; Carter v. Humboldt -FireIns. Co., 12 Iowa 287;
Godin v. London Assurance Co., 1 Burr. 489; Haneox v. Fishing Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 134.
But what is such an interest in the property is not altogether
clear upon the authorities.
In Hancox v. -fishing Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 140, Mr. Justice
STORY says, "that an insurable interest is sui generis, and peculiar in its texture and operation ;" and that, "it sometimes exists
where there is not any present property, or jus in re or Jus ad
rem." In Rohrbaeh v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 54,
FOLGER,

J., said, this interest need not amount to a legal or

equitable title to the property, but that "if there be a right in or
against the property, which some court will enforce upon the property, a right so closely connected with it, and so much dependent
for value upon the continued existence of it alone, as that a loss
of the property will cause pecuniary damage to the holder of the
right against it, he has an insurable interest."
Accordingly, it has been held that a person having a specific lien
upon property as a security for a debt, such as a mechanic or mortgagee, has an insurable interest therein, and that although he may
also have the personal obligation of his debtor for the payment of
the same: Carter v. Humboldt Fire Ins. Co., supra. And in
Herkimer v'. Bice, 27 N. Y. 163, it was held that the creditors of
an insolvent estate had an insurable interest therein, upon the
-ground that the same was pledged by the law to the payment of
the debts of the deceased. See also comments on Chief Justice
DENIO'S opinion in this case, by FOLGER, J., in Bohrbach v. Germania Tire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 57.
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But no case has been found in which it was held that a judgment
creditor, by reason simply of his lien on the judgment debtor's property, has an insurable interest therein. In Grevemeyer v. S. Mut.
Fire 1ns. Co., supra, it was distinctly held that he had not. The
decision is placed on the ground that "a judgment is a general and
not a specific lien. If there be personal property of the debtor,
it is to be satisfied out of that. If there be not, then it is a lien on
all his real estate without discrimination, and hence the plaintiff is
iiot interested in the property as property, but only in the lien."
It does not appear from the report of the case whether the d6btor
had other property out of which the judgment might have been
satisfied or not.
In considering this question it ought not to be overlooked that
insurance against loss, to the party insured, by fire, is a transaction
intended and calculated to preserve and promote the financial security and stability of the community, and therefore ought to be
regarded with favor and upheld by the courts. On the other hand,
a wagering policy, by which the assured is to receive the insurance
upon the destruction of the property, although he lost nothing
thereby, the courts will not enforce.
But in my judgment, whoever is in danger of loss by fire ought
to be allowed to insure against it. Whenever it appears that the
assured has a pecuniary interest in the preservation of the subjectmatter of the insurance against injury by fire, he has such an interest therein, or holds such a relation thereto, as gives him a right to
protect himself by insurance.
A judgment creditor, in Oregon, upon the docketing of his
judgment, has a lien upon all the real property of the judgment
debtor within the county, as a security for his debt: Oregon Code,
C. P. sect. 266. But such lien cannot be enforced, if sufficient
personal property can be found to satisfy the judgment : Id., sect.
273.
Under these circumstances if it appears that the debtor has no
personal property and that his real property, with the combustible
improvements thereon, is not more than sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, I think the creditor ought to be regarded as having an
insurable interest. Although he has no legal or equitable title to,
or interest in the property, he certainly sustains such a relation
thereto that any injury to it would cause a corresponding loss to
him; and nothing more than this can be said of the right of a mort-
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gagee, mechanic or even the legal owner to insure. In the corpus
of the property insured he may have no interest or estate, but he
has a pecuniary interest in its preservation and may sustain a loss
by its destruction: Springfield P. & Hl. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 43 N.
Y. 389.
But when the judgment debtor has personal property out of
which the judgment can be made, or when the real property upon
which it is a lien is clearly more than sufficient for that purpose, is
the judgment creditor thereby precluded from protecting himself
by insurance against possible loss from injury to his security by
fire ? This is a question upon which no direct decision has been
produced. But upon general principles I think the creditor has an
insurable interest; that is, he sustains such a relation to the subject
as gives him an interest in its preservation against fire. The law
gives the judgment creditor a lien on his debtor's real property as
a security for his debt, and whatever may be its value as compared
with the amount of the debt, if this value is chiefly or even partly
owing to the buildings thereon, and is therefore liable to be depreciated by fire, the creditor sustains such a relation to the property
that he may insure against loss by this injury to his security. And
the fact that the debtor has more orless personal property at the time
is immaterial. When the creditor concludes to enforce his judgment
this personal property may have been destroye.d or disposed of.
And so, if the real property to which the lien extends, and upon
which the insurance is effected, is then of much greater value than
the debt, it may be of much less value before the creditor levies his
execution upon it. And if, in the meantime, it should be injured
by fire, he would sustain a loss which he ought to be allowed to
protect himself against by insurance.
But, nevertheless, the lien of a judgment creditor is a general
and not a specific one. And, although, as we have seen, circumstances may, in particular cases, make it the same in effect as a specific lien, these are not to be presumed, but must be shown.
The contract for insurance being one for indemnity only, it follows
that. while the judgment creditor may insure himself against loss
by injury from fire to the whole or any part of his security-the
property upon which his judgment is a lien-yet before he can
recover on such contract as for a loss sustained by the peril insured
against, it must appear that at the time of the fire the amount
of the judgment could not have otherwise been made on an execu-
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tion against the property of the judgment debtor. If, notwithstanding the injury to the debtor's property by fire, he has sufficient left,
out of which the judgment may be made, the creditor has sustained
no loss, and can recover nothing from the insurer. His contract
was against loss to himself by fire, not his debtor.
Now the complaint in this case is silent upon this point. True,
it is alleged that the plaintiff sustained a loss by the burning of the
warehouse. But as that conclusion does not necessarily follow from
the premises, the allegation is not sufficient. The complaint should
contain a statement of the facts showing the plaintiff's right to
recover. And as his lien was pima facie a general one, on all the
judgment debtor's real property, and not a specific one on this
warehouse only, and was in effect conditioned on the debtor's want
of personal property to satisfy the judgment, the complaint ought
to show how the plaintiff sustained a loss by this fire-as that the
warehouse was all the property of the judgment debtor subject to
execution, or that what was left would not more than satisfy the
remainder of the judgment.
The plaintiff also contends that the defendant, being well aware
of the nature of his interest in the property at the time he effected
the insurance thereon, is now estopped to say that he had not an
insurable interest therein.
Conditions and.restrictions contained in a policy may be considered waived by a knowledge, on the part of t&e insurer, of facts
inconsistent therewith. In such case the insurer may be estopped
to insist on the condition, as that no other insurance existed on the
property. Wood on Fire Insurance, sect. 498.
But a contract of insurance entered into contrary to law or public policy is simply void, and neither party to it is estopped from
showing the fact. " Otherwise the public law and policy would be
at the mercy of individual interest and caprice." -fn re Comstock,
3 Saw. 228. If the plaintiff sustained no such relation to this
property as entitled him to have it insured against injury by fire,
his contract with the defendant to that effect was a mere wagering
policy, and void, as being contrary to public policy.
But in my judgment the plaintiff was entitled to insure the
property-he had a pecuniary interest in its preservation and might
protect himself against possible loss by its destruction. His was
not a wagering policy, as his right to the insurance was not conditional, not simply on the destruction of the property, but also his
loss thereby.

